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THE PENDING GAUNTLET TO FREE




There is an appointed time for everything, and a time for every affair
under the heavens... a time to be silent, and a time to speak'
I. INTRODUCTION
David Motherwell, E. Scott Hartley and Louis Mensonides, three
religious counselors at Community Chapel-a small evangelical church
in Seattle, Washington-were convicted for criminal failure to report
suspected child abuse.2 Reverend Ernest Knoche, a Lutheran clergyman
in Pennsylvania, was subpoenaed to testify before a federal grand jury
concerning subjects discussed during family counseling sessions. 3 Fa-
ther Kohlmann, a Catholic priest, returned stolen goods to the rightful
* Associate Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America; Visiting Professor of
Law, Georgetown University Law Center; B.A., La Salle University; J.D., School of Law,
University of Virginia; M.Ch.A., D. Min., The Catholic University of America.
** Assistant City Solicitor, Law Department, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; B.A., The Uni-
versity of Delaware; J.D., The Catholic University of America.
1. Ecclesiastes 3:1, 7 (New Am. Bible).
2. See State v. Motherwell, 788 P.2d 1066, 1067 (Wash. 1990). The Supreme Court of
Washington, en banc, affirmed the convictions of Motherwell and Mensonides, but reversed
Hartley's conviction. The court reversed because Hartley was the only one of the three who
was an ordained minister, and the Washington reporting statute exempted clergy by omission
when they were counseling as clergy. Id. at 1069. The statute stated in pertinent part: "When
any practitioner, professional school personnel, registered or licensed nurse, social worker,
psychologist, pharmacist, or employee of the department [of social and health services] has
reasonable cause to believe that a child.., has suffered abuse or neglect, he shall report such
incident .... Id. at 1068. The court noted that the statute defined "clergy" as .any regularly
licensed or ordained minister, priest or rabbi of any church or religious denomination, whether
acting in an individual capacity or as an employee or agent of any public or private organiza-
tion or institution." I. at 1069.
See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1605 (1990).
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, opined that accommodations for free exercise should be
left to the political process. Id. at 1606. The Washington statute's omission of clergy is such a
political accommodation. See generally Review of Supreme Court's Term, 59 U.S.L.W. 3081
(Aug. 14, 1990) (emphasizing Supreme Court's drift toward political accommodation of
religion).
3. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 376 (3d Cir. 1990).
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owner after a parishioner confessed that he had knowingly received the
stolen property.' Kohlmann was also subpoenaed by a grand jury to
identify those responsible for the crime.'
These three cases share similar factual contexts: they all involve at-
tempts by the state to compel individuals functioning in a religious ca-
pacity to reveal confidential statements made during religious practices.
In each case, the involved cleric refused to do so based on the First
Amendment's guarantee of free exercise of religion.6 In all three in-
stances, each court allowed the person acting as clergy to maintain the
confidentiality of such communications.7 The courts, however, offered
different reasons to support their conclusions.
Minister Hartley's conviction was reversed on appeal because the
court found that the state legislature intended to exempt clergy from its
mandatory reporting statute.' Pastor Knoche found protection from the
federal grand jury subpoena within the clergy-communicant privilege set
forth in the Federal Rules of Evidence.9 Lastly, the court maintained the
confidentiality of Father Kohlmann's penitent based on his First Amend-
ment right to free exercise of religion. °
The factual context is important in each of these challenges to confi-
dential communications that are made during religious practice. Under
a state statute mandating that clergy report instances of child abuse, an
4. People v. Philips, N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. (1813). The Philips case was never officially
published, but a participating attorney reported on the case in WILLIAM SAMPSON, THE
CATHOLIC QUESTION IN AMERICA (1813 reprinted in 1974). See also Michael J. McConnell,
The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1410, 1410-11 (1990).
5. SAMPSON, supra note 4, at 53; McConnell, supra note 4, at 1411.
6. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment states in pertinent part: "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof." Id.; see Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d at 378; Motherwell, 788 P.2d at 1073-74;
SAMPSON, supra note 4, at 53.
7. Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d at 388; Motherwell, 788 P.2d at 1076; SAMPSON,
supra note 4, at 114.
8. Motherwell, 788 P.2d at 1076. The court noted that prior to 1975, the Washington
reporting statute specifically included clergy within the reporting mandate. Id. at 1069. The
court then pointed out that in 1975, the state legislature deleted the reference to clergy. Id. at
1069. The Washington Supreme Court found in this deletion an implied exemption of clergy
and held that "members of the clergy counseling their parishioners in the religious context"
were not subject to the reporting mandate. Id. at 1069. Minister Hartley's co-defendants were
not ordained at the time they learned of the suspected child abuse and thus did not fall within
the clergy exemption. Id.
9. FED. R. EVID. 501; see Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d at 379-83 (interpreting
Rule 501 to include clergy-communicant privilege).
10. See SAMPSON, supra note 4, at 114. The New York court ruled that the priest was
constitutionally exempt from testifying before the grand jury. Id. The court found that the
state's interest did not outweigh the burden on religious practice. Id.
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exception given to clergy for disclosures made during religious acts will
exempt the cleric who meets the factual requirements of that exception.
Clerics will also be exempt to the extent that Congress provides for a
clergy-communicant privilege under the Federal Rules of Evidence.11
Similar to the various state evidentiary privileges,12 the Federal Rules of
Evidence would exempt clergy if four fundamental prerequisites are
met. 3 However, when a child abuse reporting statute fails to exempt
clerics from reporting instances of child abuse, or specifically names cler-
ics among those who are required to report, the cleric faces a dilemma in
the conflict between the tenets of his or her religion and the legal duty
under the statute. 4 An increasing number of states have created this
dilemma by seeking to stem the tide of child abuse cases with mandatory
reporting statutes that include clergy. 5
It is within this third factual context that the gauntlet lies before the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment: 6 may the cleric look to
11. FED. R. EvID. 501.
12. See infra notes 147-211 and accompanying text for a discussion of the clergy-commu-
nicant evidentiary privilege in general and the various state evidentiary privileges.
13. 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285, at 527 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). Dean
Wigmore states:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be
disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory main-
tenance of the relation between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be
sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communica-
tions must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of
litigation.
Id. But see Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d at 379 n.6 (stating that in federal civil cases
deference must be given to any applicable state law governing privilege).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. I. See supra note 6 for the text of the First Amendment Free
Exercise Clause.
15. Although this Article will briefly discuss other professionals who are required to re-
port child abuse, it will focus on statutes that mandate reporting by clergy.
States include clergy within the purview of mandatory reporting statutes in different ways.
A state may specifically include clergy within the mandate to report suspected cases of child
abuse, see, e-g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-101(b) (West Supp. 1991), or may require
reports from "all persons" and not recognize a clergy privilege, see, eg., IND. CODE ANN.
§ 31-6-11-3 (Bums 1987 & Supp. 1991). The clergy-communicant privilege may either be ex-
pressly abrogated, see, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3620(G) (1989 & Supp. 1990) (abro-
gates clergy-communicant privilege as grounds to discharge duty to report), or impliedly
abrogated by revocation of all or some combination of privileges, see, e.g., NEv. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 432B.250 (Michie 1986) (any person required to report may not invoke any privilege
as grounds for failure to report). See infra notes 105-46 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of the various approaches taken by state legislatures.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. I. See supra note 6 for the text of the First Amendment Free
Exercise Clause.
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the First Amendment to protect confidences transmitted during religious
rituals? Can the Free Exercise Clause be weakened to allow enforcement
of mandatory child abuse reporting statutes that conflict with the right to
objective exercise of religion? Because the United States Supreme Court
has rejected the compelling state interest test which allowed exemptions
for religious conduct from generally applicable statutes,1 7 these statutes
must now confront religion directly. The specific question of the consti-
tutionality of mandatory reporting statutes sets the stage for a conflict
between a traditional state concern-the protection of children from
abuse 8--and religious practices, such as the penitential rite of the Ro-
man Catholic Church.19
This Article analyzes the conflict between statutory child abuse re-
porting requirements for clergy20 and the clergy-communicant privilege
for confidential communications made within specific religious practices.
The constitutional conflict arises between the state's interest in the pro-
tection of children by requiring that suspected cases of abuse be reported
and the clergy's interest in the free exercise of their religious tenets by
maintaining confidentiality.21 this analysis recognizes that state legisla-
tors have broadened reporting requirements to include more and more
classes of people in an effort to arrest the tremendous increase in child
abuse in the past decade.22 As a result, the shield of privileged communi-
17. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1604-06
(1990). See infra notes 65-77 for a discussion of the compelling state interest test.
18. The state's interest in preventing child abuse entails both the protection of children
from their abusers and the prevention of abused children from becoming abusers themselves.
Researchers have reported a pattern of future abuse committed by those who have been abused
as children. See Raymond C. O'Brien, Pedophilia: The Legal Predicament of the Clergy, 4 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & PoL'Y 91, 114 (1988). But cf. James M. Peters et al., Why Prosecute
Child Abuse?, 34 S.D. L. REv. 649, 654-55 (1989) (discussing research findings that refute
conclusion that abusers were themselves victims of abuse).
19. This conflict affects more than the Roman Catholic religion. In fact, the challenge to
the free exercise right is greatest for the "confessional" practices of minority religions which
are not as well-documented or historically rooted as the Roman Catholic Seal of Confession.
20. Each state statute requiring reports of child abuse specifies those who fall within the
mandate, see, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 16-1619(a) (Supp. 1991) (including physicians, school
teachers and social workers as classes required to report), and those who are exempted from
the requirement, see, eg., MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-705(a)(3)(Supp. 1990) (clergy not
required to provide notice of child abuse where bound by canon law, church doctrine or prac-
tice to maintain confidentiality). No state has a singular statute requiring only clergy to report
child abuse. See infra notes 105-46 for a discussion of child abuse reporting statutes.
21. See infra notes 212-319 and accompanying text for a discussion of the constitutional
conflict.
22. More than 2.4 million cases of child abuse were reported last year. Andrea Jurgrau,
How to Spot Child Abuse, RN, Oct. 1990, at 23. This is equivalent to more than 30 children
per 1000. Unfortunately, an even greater number of cases have gone unreported. See id. Of
the cases that are reported, relatively few are prosecuted because often "the report does not
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the way in which the Court has interpreted other constitutional provi-
sions to afford rights to minorities not protected by the political process27
should serve as a guide for the Court when it addresses the conflict be-
tween free exercise and child abuse reporting statutes. The First Amend-
ment should protect those farthest from the political process in their
religious practices in the same fashion that it protects anti-majoritarian
political views.
Finally, this Article proposes that the interests of the state served by
the clergy-communicant privilege outweigh the interest in protecting
children through mandated reporting. In an effort to evoke protection of
these confidential communications through the political process, this Ar-
ticle examines the constructive role of clergy-communicant confidential-
ity in the prevention of child abuse. What appears to be a conflict
between mandatory reporting statutes and the assertion of confidentiality
is actually two different means to the same end of protecting children.
No legal analysis concerning the possibility of litigation over the enforce-
ability of child abuse reporting statutes should ever lose sight of the fact
that protecting children from abuse is paramount to both the clergy and
the state.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Factual Context
The three cases noted above2 8 represent factual paradigms for the
analysis of the legal issues raised by mandatory reporting statutes. State
v. Motherwell29 involved the prosecution of three religious counselors for
violation of a child abuse reporting statute.30 David Motherwell coun-
seled members of his church on a variety of topics such as marriage,
family, relationships and finances, but his primary concern was "develop-
ing ... [the counselee's] personal relationship with Jesus Christ."31 In
27. See, e.g., Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157; Osborne, 110 S. Ct. 1691; Bouknight, 110 S. Ct. 900;
Palmore v. Sidotti, 466 U.S. 429 (1983) (Equal Protection Clause outweighs personal biases
against interracial remarriage in child custody decisions); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)
(state's police power to regulate interracial marriages must yield to Equal Protection Clause);
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (state's interest in forbidding interracial cohabita-
tion must yield to Fourteenth Amendment); Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955)
(right to public education must never yield to administrative implementation difficulties);
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (public policy must yield to principle of free aliena-
tion of land without respect to race).
28. See supra notes 2-10 and accompanying text.
29. 788 P.2d 1066 (Wash. 1990).
30. Id. at 1067. See infra notes 206-09 and accompanying text for a discussion of clergy
qualifications to counsel in child abuse cases.
31. Motherwell, 788 P.2d at 1067.
[Vol. 25:1
November 1991] CLERGY AND REPORTING STA TUTES
cations between clergy and communicant, attorney and client, doctor
and patient, and counselor and client, has become more narrowly de-
fined. The legislative reevaluation of the clergy-communicant privilege
involves a greater constitutional issue: whether the religious liberty in-
terest protected by the Free Exercise Clause can withstand one of the
most egregious situations within society, the abuse of children.
This Article evaluates the First Amendment protection of freedom
of religion, specifically the right to maintain privileged communications
as an exercise of religious practice, in light of the United States Supreme
Court's treatment of other rights guaranteed by the Constitution.23 For
example, if a priest is to assert the privilege to maintain the confidential-
ity of information received within the Sacrament of Penance,24 the inter-
est in doing so must equal or outweigh the state's interest in protecting
children. A number of United States Supreme Court decisions have bal-
anced similar interests in a variety of cases.25 Thus, even if the Court has
abandoned the balancing involved in the compelling state interest test,
26
allege activity that violates a criminal law or does not identify a perpetrator .... Most often,
however, a reported case is not prosecuted because, in the prosecutor's judgment, there is not
enough evidence to meet the criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Peters et
al., supra note 18, at 656-57.
There has been an evolution of the type of cases that have been reported in the past
decade and a wider range of child abuse victims has been identified. Whereas in the past 10
years the so-called "classic" cases of multiple fractures, severely underweight children, and
traumatic sexual assault constituted the majority of cases, the trend in recent years has been
towards cases of less severe injuries being reported, presumably as a result of misinterpreta-
tions by caretakers or overconcern about sexual abuse. See William N. Marshall, Jr., et al.,
New Child Abuse Spectrum in an Era of Increased Awareness, 142 AM. J. DISEASES CHILDREN
664, 666 (1988) (demonstrating that as recognition and awareness of child abuse changes, so
do kinds of patients being seen by physicians).
23. Smith concerned itself only with generally applicable laws as they related to "relig-
iously motivated action." Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1601. In those hybrid situations where the free
exercise claim is "in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of
speech and of the press," a compelling state interest test is appropriate. Id. See infra notes 72-
90 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Smith decision.
24. The Sacrament of Penance is a rite of the Roman Catholic Church. Pursuant to the
Code of Canon Law the penitent sincerely confesses his or her sins to a priest, and resolves to
reform and to obtain God's forgiveness. Through this rite, the penitent is reconciled with the
church. 1983 CODE c.959.
25. See, e.g., Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990) (Confrontation Clause may be
outweighed by interest in protecting children); Osborne v. Ohio, 110 S. Ct. 1691 (1990) (pro-
tection of child may outweigh First Amendment interest involving right to possess and view
pornography); Baltimore City Dep't of Social Servs. v. Bouknight, 110 S. Ct. 900 (1990) (Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination may give way to state interest in protecting
children). See infra notes 270-303 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Supreme
Court's reasoning in these cases.
26. See Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1602-06. See infra notes 65-77 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the compelling state interest test.
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the course of his counseling, a woman told him that her husband was
sexually abusing their eight-year-old daughter and was violent with the
rest of the family.32 E. Scott Hartley, the only ordained minister among
the three religious counselors, was told by another woman that her hus-
band had sexually molested their daughter.33 Hartley attempted to rec-
oncile the family by discussing the problem with both the husband and
the daughter.34 Likewise, a woman told Louis Mensonides that her hus-
band had beaten their two sons, who were ages four and seven at the
time.35 Mensonides held counseling sessions with the older of the two
boys.36 None of the three counselors reported these incidents to the au-
thorities as required under the Washington statute, and all three were
convicted of failing to comply with the reporting requirement.37 The ap-
pellate court overturned Hartley's conviction based on his status as an
ordained minister.3" The court implied an exemption from the Washing-
ton reporting statute for clergy when acting in the role of religious coun-
selor.39 The other convictions were upheld.'
In re Grand Jury Investigation41 involved a Lutheran clergyman
called before a federal grand jury to testify about subjects discussed dur-
ing a family counseling session.42 Pastor Knoche stated that family
counseling "constituted a typical and important part of his ministry.
'4 3
The district judge accepted the pastor's argument and concluded that
"compelling the pastor to testify would break down church-state divi-
sions, infringe upon the right to participate in religious activities, invade
a 'sacrosanct' area, and, through depriving families of confidential reli-
gious counseling, endanger them."'










41. 918 F.2d 374 (3d Cir. 1990).
42. Id. at 377-78. See infra notes 206-09 for a discussion of clergy qualifications to counsel
in child abuse cases.
43. Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d at 378. The district court characterized the pas-
tor's ministry as founded upon the Judeo-Christian notion of redemption and forgiveness
through counseling and prayer. Furthermore, persons spiritually counseled expect that their
communications will be kept in strict confidence. Id.
44. Id.
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peals to compel the clergyman's testimony.45 Relying on the confidential
communications privilege in the Federal Rules of Evidence,46 the court
decided that the "privilege protects communications to a member of the
clergy, in his or her spiritual capacity, by persons who seek spiritual
counseling and who reasonably expect that their words will be kept in
confidence."'47 The court generously affirmed the privilege, recognizing
that "virtually every state has recognized some form [thereof]," 48 it is
available in the context of multiple parties, and is "socially desirable.
49
The court remanded the case for further proceedings, but left no doubt
that if the communications fit within the confines of the privilege, the
minister could not be compelled to reveal what he had learned during the
counseling sessions.5 0
45. Id. at 376.
46. FED. R. EVID. 501.
47. Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d at 377. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule
501 is applicable to state grand jury proceedings and is an evolution of privileges in federal
criminal cases. Id. at 399. Nonetheless, "Rule 501, as it applies to federal civil cases, incorpo-
rates the doctrine of Erie R.R. Co. v. Thompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and requires deference
to any applicable state law governing privileges." Id at 379 n.6 (parallel citations omitted).
Thus, the applicability of state law in civil cates is determinative. See infra notes 147-211 and
accompanying text for further discussion of the civil context of privilege. See also O'Brien,
supra note 18, at 138-50. z
48. Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d at 381. See infra note 147 for citations to clergy-
communicant privilege statutes.
49. Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d at 383. See infra notes 206-11 stating the argu-
ment that confessional opportunities are socially desirable.
50. Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d at 384-85. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals was
also willing to allow inquiry into the "pastoral counseling practices of the relevant synod of the
Lutheran Church." Id. This is "both a necessary and a constitutionally inoffensive threshold
step in determining whether a privilege interdenominational in nature applies in light of the
facts and circumstances of a particular case." Id at 387 n.21. Such an inquiry is pertinent to a
free exercise claim, for such a claim is conditioned upon beliefs rooted in religion; secular
beliefs, however sincere and conscientious, do not suffice. See, eg., Africa v. Pennsylvania,
662 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 1981) (prisoner could not claim special diet privilege since claim was
not based on religious beliefs), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 908 (1982); United States v. Kuch, 288 F.
Supp. 439 (D.D.C. 1968) (claim to justify marijuana use as free exercise right not based on
religious beliefs). But see Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct.
1595, 1604 (1990), where Justice Scalia wrote for the majority: "[C]ourts must not presume to
determine the place of a particular belief in a religion or the plausibility of a religious claim."
Id. Indeed, one of the rationales for the Court's rejection of the use of the compelling interest
test in Smith was because "it is horrible to contemplate that federal judges will regularly bal-
ance against the importance of general laws the significance of religious practice." Id. at 1606
n.5. Even though Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion in Smith in favor of use of the
compelling interest test, she agreed with the majority's use of Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490
U.S. 680 (1989) ("It is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs
or practices to a faith."). She did, however, allow for courts to examine sincerely held religious
beliefs. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1603 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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Finally, in the New York case of People v. Philips, 1 Daniel Philips
entered the confessional and confessed to Father Kohlmann, his parish
priest, that he had knowingly received stolen goods.5 2 The priest insisted
that the penitent return the stolen goods, and the man brought the items
to the priest under the confidentiality of the Seal of Confession.5 3 It was
when the priest returned the goods to the rightful owner that Father
Kohlmann was subpoenaed to appear before the grand jury to identify
those responsible for the crime. 4 The priest refused to identify them,
claiming religious privilege.5"
The court addressed the issue of whether the Free Exercise Clause
required an exemption from the legal duty to testify56 and ruled that the
51. See SAMPSON, supra note 4, at 112-14.
52. McConnell, supra note 4, at 1410-11; see SAMPSON, supra note 4, at 5-12.
53. SAMPSON, supra note 4, at 5-12. "The sacramental seal is the strict and inviolable
obligation of keeping secret all matters that have been related to the confessor for the purpose
of obtaining absolution, the revelation of which would render the sacrament odious and oner-
ous." CODE OF CANON LAW: A TEXT AND COMMENTARY 927 (James A. Coriden et al. eds.,
1985) [hereinafter CODE OF CANON LAW].
54. SAMPSON, supra note 4, at 5.
55. Id. at 10-12. Father Kohlmann testified:
[I]f called upon to testify in quality of a minister of a sacrament, in which my God
himself has enjoined on me a perpetual and inviolable secrecy, I must declare to this
honorable Court, that I cannot, I must not answer any question that has a bearing
upon the restitution in question; and that it would be my duty to prefer instantaneous
death or any temporal misfortune, rather than disclose the name of the penitent in
question. For, were I to act otherwise, I should become a traitor to my church, to
my sacred ministry and to my God. In fine, I should render myself guilty of eternal
damnation.
McConnell, supra note 4, at 1411. The case of People v. Philips, N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. (1813),
marked the first recognition of the clergy-communicant privilege in the United States. Mary
Harter Mitchell, Must Clergy Tell? Child Abuse Reporting Requirements Versus the Clergy
Privilege and Free Exercise of Religion, 71 MINN. L. REv. 723, 737 (1987).
56. SAMPSON, supra note 4, at 51; see also McConnell, supra note 4, at 1411. Professor
McConnell framed the issue presented to the court in Philips:
[D]oes the freedom of religious exercise guaranteed by the constitutions of the states
and the United States require the government, in the absence of a sufficiently compel-
ling need, to grant exemptions from legal duties that conflict with religious obliga-
tions? Or does this freedom guarantee only that religious believers will be governed
by equal laws, without discrimination or preference?
Id. In order to determine whether the Free Exercise Clause requires an exemption from a
generally applicable law, the United States Supreme Court has applied the compelling state
interest test. See Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1610 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Thus, the compelling
state interest test and the free exercise exemptions doctrine become one when the doctrine is
explained:
If the plaintiff can show that a law or governmental practice inhibits the exercise of
his religious beliefs, the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate that the law
or practice is necessary to the accomplishment of some important (or "compelling")
secular objective and that it is the least restrictive means of achieving that objective.
If the plaintiff meets his burden and the government does not, the plaintiff is entitled
to exemption from the law or practice at issue.
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priest was constitutionally exempt from testifying.57 The decision was
based on a balancing of the government's interest in access to evidence in
the adversarial process against religious obligations."8 The court found
that "[a]lthough the government had a legitimate need and the authority
to compel testimony, that need did not outweigh the interference with
the relationship between priests and penitents in the Roman Catholic
Church." 59
B. The Legal Context
Free exercise doctrine has a convoluted history.' The first recorded
American case to recognize the free exercise exemption was People v.
Philips,6 1 decided by a New York court in 1813. Philips held that the
Constitution required that a Catholic priest be exempt from testifying
before the grand jury regarding confessional communications. 6 2 The
court found that religious confession was deeply rooted in American
practices both before and after independence. 63 Nonetheless, a series of
United States Supreme Court cases over the next 150 years upheld laws
that precluded religious practicesf"
1. Development of free exercise jurisprudence
In 1963 modem free exercise doctrine began to emerge with the
McConnell, supra note 4, at 1416-17 (citation omitted). See infra notes 65-77 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of the compelling state interest test.
57. McConnell, supra note 4, at 1411.
58. Id. at 1411-12.
59. Id
60. Id. at 1410-13, 1511-12.
61. SAMPSON, supra note 4, at 5-114; see also McConnell, supra note 4, at 1410-12 (Catho-
lic priest called upon to testify about identity of parishioner who confessed to receiving stolen
goods).
62. SAMPSON, supra note 4, at 108-44. "It is essential to the free exercise of religion, that
its ordinances should be administered-that its ceremonies as well as its essentials should be
protected. The sacraments of a religion are its most important elements." Id. at 111.
63. McConnell, supra note 4, at 1412.
64. Id. (citing Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (upholding Sunday closing laws
against Orthodox Jews); Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946) (finding Mann Act
violation where members of polygamous religious sect transported wives across state lines);
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (enforcing child labor laws against child distrib-
uting religious literature); Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934) (up-
holding suspension of students refusing to participate in ROTC because of religious
convictions against war); The Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890) (upholding statute revoking charter of Mormon church and
confiscating property); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890) (upholding enforcement of anti-
polygamy laws against Mormons); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (upholding
enforcement of anti-polygamy laws against Mormons)).
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Supreme Court's decision in Sherbert v. Verner.6" In Sherbert, the Court
held that facially neutral laws burdening religious practices require re-
view under a strict scrutiny standard.66 A free exercise claimant had to
establish that his or her sincerely held religious belief conflicted with a
law or government regulation.67 The burden then would shift to the
state, which had to demonstrate that the law or regulation at issue served
a compelling state interest and implemented the least restrictive means to
achieve that end.68 The Supreme Court expanded the Sherbert doctrine
and applied the compelling state interest test to a generally applicable
criminal law in Wisconsin v. Yoder.6 9 During the next twenty-seven
years, the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence sought to accommo-
date both the express textual mandate of the Constitution7° and the gov-
ernment's interest in regulating conduct by applying the compelling state
interest test.
71
2. Abandonment of the compelling state interest test: Employment
Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith
In 1990 the Supreme Court abandoned a significant portion of the
history of free exercise doctrine when it rejected the compelling state in-
terest test in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v.
Smith.72 Justice Scalia wrote for the majority denying a free exercise
65. 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (state must modify its unemployment compensation requirement
to accommodate needs of those religiously opposed to working on Saturdays); see also Ken-
neth Marin, Employment Division v. Smith: The Supreme Court Alters the State of Free Exer-
cise Doctrine, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 1431, 1438-41 (1991); McConnell, supra note 4, at 1412.
66. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403.
67. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERcAN CoNsTrTmoNAL LAW § 14-12, at 1242-51 (2d ed.
1988).
68. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406 (only compelling state interest may justify infringement
of free exercise right); see also Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 141
(1987) (applying strict scrutiny test to strike down denial of unemployment benefits to Sev-
enth-Day Adventist fired for refusing to work on sabbath); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S.
707, 718-20 (1981) (applying strict scrutiny test to strike down denial of unemployment bene-
fits for Jehovah's Witness whose religious beliefs prevented him from making weapons); Wis-
consin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220-29 (1972) (finding no compelling state interest in imposing
mandatory high school education on Amish children).
69. 406 U.S. 205, 218-19 (1972).
70. U.S. CONST. amend. I. See supra note 6 for the text of the First Amendment Free
Exercise Clause.
71. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1608 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., concurring). See Marin, supra note 65, at 1445-51, for a discussion of the
decline of free exercise protection prior to the Smith decision.
72. 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1602-06 (1990) (compelling interest test inapplicable to free exercise
challenges to criminal prohibitions). Justice Scalia attempted to limit the Court's application
of the compelling interest test to cases involving challenges to state unemployment compensa-
tion rules. Id. at 1603. In contrast, Justice O'Connor's concurrence summarized the history
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exemption for the Native American Church practice of peyote use.
The majority concluded that the compelling state interest test was inap-
plicable to First Amendment challenges against generally applicable state
laws.74 The Court held that cases where the First Amendment had
barred the application of a "neutral, generally applicable law to relig-
iously motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause
alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitu-
tional protections, such as freedom of speech and of the press."' 7- Thus,
the Court in Smith limited the application of the compelling state interest
test to instances where a hybrid claim couples a free exercise challenge
with another alleged constitutional violation. In all cases not involving
such a "hybrid situation,, 76 the Smith decision relegated the accommo-
dation of religious practices to the political process. 77 As a result, Smith
marks a significant departure from the historical understanding of the
purposes of the Free Exercise Clause.
Specifically, the Supreme Court decided that the freedom of reli-
gious believers must be governed by equal laws, without discrimination
of free exercise doctrine and the centrality of the compelling interest test to First Amendment
jurisprudence. See id. at 1607-13 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
73. Id. at 1606.
74. Id. at 1603.
75. Id. at 1601.
76. Id. In his comments on the Smith decision, the Reverend Charles Whelan, S.J.,
stated: "[l]f all you've got is a Free Exercise case, and the law is of general application, then
the necessity to show a compelling state interest does not apply." Reverend Charles Whelan,
S.J., Address at Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth National Meeting of Diocesan Attorneys 30
(Apr. 30-May 1, 1990) (transcript available in Office of General Counsel, United States Catho-
lic Conference, Washington, D.C.).
Father Whelan speculates that the Court's shift in Smith was suggested in Jimmy Swag-
gart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 110 S. Ct. 688 (1990). Whelan, supra, at 23-24. In
that case, the unanimous Court concluded that a generally applicable sales tax does not impose
any significant burden on the distribution of religious books nor, therefore, on religious prac-
tices or beliefs. Swaggart Ministries, 110 S. Ct. at 696-97.
77. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1606. Admitting that the denial of a free exercise exemption will
have an impact upon minority religious practices, Justice Scalia wrote "that unavoidable con-
sequence of democratic government must be preferred to a system in which each conscience is
a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social importance of all laws against the central-
ity of all religious beliefs." Id.
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion supports the application of the free exercise excep-
tion and the historical approach. "[t]he First Amendment was enacted precisely to protect
the rights of those whose religious practices are not shared by the majority and may be viewed
with hostility." Id. at 1613 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
On June 24, 1991, the Oregon legislature amended the state's controlled substances stat-
ute that criminalizes the manufacture, delivery and possession of peyote. Act approved June
24, 1991, ch. 329, amending OR. REv. STAT. § 475.922 (WL, OR-LEGIS). The amendment
establishes an affirmative defense that the peyote is being used or is intended for use in accord-
ance with religious belief or in religious practice. Id.
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or preference.78 This approach abolishes, the compelling state interest
test which allowed for exemptions from legal duties that conflict with
religious obligations. Justice Scalia wrote for the majority: "We con-
clude ... that the sounder approach... is to hold the [compelling state
interest] test inapplicable."79 This holding represents a rejection of the
established legal context of the free exercise exemption,80 which histori-
cally had been seen "as a natural and legitimate response to the tension
between law and religious conviction."81
The Smith decision purports to take the Court another step away
from "a system in which ... judges weigh the social importance of all
laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs." ' Yet the judiciary
cannot avoid this kind of balancing. Based on an historical analysis of
free exercise jurisprudence, 3 the legislative branch has not always pro-
tected the inalienable right of free exercise of religion.a Thus, under an
78. See Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1603.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1607-09 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
81. McConnell, supra note 4, at 1466. Professor McConnell captured the essence of the
issue raised by the Smith decision when he wrote:
It might be objected that the example of exemptions from religious assessments is
inapt, because generally applicable law is itself religious, not secular, and would be
unconstitutional under the establishment clause today.... [However,] Et]he decisive
question... is whether the people at the time of the adoption of the first amendment
would likely have considered exemptions, whether legislative or judicial, an appropri-
ate remedy when law and conscience conflict....
[I]t is reasonable to suppose that framers of constitutional free exercise pro-
visions understood that ... applications ... would be made by the courts, once
courts were entrusted with the responsibility of enforcing the mandates of free
exercise.
Id. at 1470, 1473.
This conclusion, which justifies the Court's role in balancing the burden on religious prac-
tice against the state's interest, was implied in a brief reference to the legal context of free
exercise decisions after Smith when Professor McConnell wrote: "The historical record casts
doubt on [the Smith] interpretation of the free exercise clause." Id. at" 1420. McConnell's
conclusion is based on history, and "while the historical evidence is limited and on some points
mixed, the record shows that exemptions on account of religious scruple should have been
familiar to the framers and ratifiers of the free exercise clause." Id. at 1511.
The author notes that the issue of exemptions arose during colonial times over three is-
sues: oath requirements, military conscriptions and religious assessments. Id. at 1512.
82. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1606.
83. Professor McConnell wrote:
Indeed, the evidence suggests that the theoretical underpinning of the free exercise
clause, best reflected in Madison's writings, is that the claims of the "universal sover-
eign" precede the claims of civil society, both in time and in authority, and that when
the people vested power in the government over civil affairs, they necessarily reserved
their unalienable right to the free exercise of religion, in accordance with the dictates
of conscience.
McConnell, supra note 4, at 1512.
84. See Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1613 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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historical analysis of the Free Exercise Clause, accommodations for reli-
gious practices cannot be left to the exclusive role of the political pro-
cess."5 Insofar as Smith eviscerates the historical role of the judiciary to
grant exemptions under the Free Exercise Clause, the gauntlet has been
tossed before the First Amendment's protection of religious convictions
.unable to find accommodation within the political process.
The Smith decision has already wrought significant changes. For
example, the Sixth Circuit in Vandiver v. Hardin County Board of Educa-
tion 86 ruled that a free exercise challenge to a Kentucky regulation was
precluded. 7 The court noted the change in the legal context after Smith
and held the regulation valid.88 Because the court found no "hybrid situ-
[Tihe First Amendment was enacted precisely to protect the rights of those whose
religious practices are not shared by the majority and may be viewed with hostility.
The history of our free exercise doctrine amply demonstrates the harsh impact
majoritarian rule has had on unpopular or emerging religious groups such as the
Jehovah's Witnesses and the Amish.... The compelling interest test reflects the
First Amendment's mandate of preserving religious liberty to the fullest extent possi-
ble in a pluralistic society.
Id.
85. The reason is that "[a] religious duty does not cease to be a religious duty merely
because the legislature has passed a generally applicable law making compliance difficult or
impossible." McConnell, supra note 4, at 1512.
Professor McConnell's conclusions are based primarily on James Madison's position re-
quiring judicial exemptions. McConnell also relied on a personal conclusion:
[For those] who provided the political muscle for religious freedom in America....
the freedom to follow religious dogma was one of this nation's foremost blessings,
and the willingness of the nation to respect the claims of a higher authority than
'those whose business it was to make laws' was one of the surest signs of its liberality.
Id. at 1517.
86. 925 F.2d 927 (6th Cir. 1991).
87. Id. at 932. The regulation required that students transferring from a non-accredited
secondary school receive credits either by passing an equivalency examination for a particular
course, or by successfully performing in a higher level course by achieving an average grade in
the course by the twelfth week of school. Id. at 929. The student refused to take the
equivalency tests because of a sincere belief that the testing requirement was unfair because
"the Lord will [not] allow me a bigger burden than I could carry." Id. at 931.
88. Id. at 932. The court stated:
We conclude that Kentucky's regulation of public school testing and academic stand-
ing is a valid and neutral law of general applicability within the meaning of Smith, so
that a free exercise challenge is presumably precluded....
... [Thus,] only if ... the student's free exercise challenge is joined with other
constitutional concerns may his claim survive the free exercise standard of Smith.
Id. at 932-33.
Interpreting Smith, the Vandiver court wrote: "[A] criminal statute of general applicabil-
ity not directed at religious practices was simply not subject to a free exercise challenge." Id.
at 932. Furthermore, the court agreed with other circuits that have extended Smith's holding
to neutral civil statutes. Id.
The court concluded that there was "a small crack for free exercise challenges to generally
applicable, religion-neutral laws even when such challenges are not joined with an alleged
infringement of another constitutional interest." Id. The court found that "[if] the state has
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ation"8 9 in this case, the student was denied a free exercise exemption to
the state statute. 90
3. The impact of Smith and some unanswered questions
The new legal context for religious freedom continues to take shape
as courts decide free exercise challenges in the wake of the Smith deci-
sion.91 This reshaping of the doctrine raises several unanswered ques-
tions about the future of free exercise jurisprudence. Is there an
exemption for religious practices after Smith? What if the state's gener-
ally applicable statute encompasses a traditional state concern such as
health and safety of citizens?92
Specifically, what if the state health and safety statute requires that
priests who take confessions from penitents must report instances of
child abuse, and this mandated reporting encompasses communications
within the Seal of Confession?93 What if this confessional material is
protected under a religious code94 that affirms the seriousness of confi-
in place a system of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system to cases of
'religious hardship' without compelling reason." Id. at 927, 933 (quoting Employment Div.,
Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1603 (1990)). In Vandiver, the court
found that the state allowed no system of individual exemptions. Id. at 934.
89. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1601-02; see supra notes 72-85 and accompanying text.
90. Vandiver, 925 F.2d at 933.
91. See, eg., Vestry of St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348 (2d
Cir. 1990) (limitation on options of church to raise revenue for expansion of religious charita-
ble activities did not violate Free Exercise Clause), cerL denied, 111 S. Ct. 1103 (1991); Mont-
gomery v. County of Clinton, 743 F. Supp. 1253 (W.D. Mich. 1990) (statute mandating
autopsies of all violent death victims not violative of Free Exercise Clause).
Note that the issue of free exercise exemption does not encompass those instances when
the state legislature or Congress has granted an exemption. In Peyote Way Church of God v.
Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1991), the Fifth Circuit held that federal and state regu-
lations exempting members of the Native American Church from prosecution for religious use
of peyote, but not members of other religious groups who use peyote as a sacrament, are
constitutional. Id. at 1220. The free exercise issue appears to arise only when the state im-
poses a generally applicable law, and the person coming within the purview of the legislation
seeks exemption under the Free Exercise Clause.
92. Smith's majority opinion specifically called attention to the role of the states in
promulgating health and safety statutes: "[I]t is hard to see any reason in principle or practi-
cality why the government should have to tailor its health and safety laws to conform to the
diversity of religious belief." Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1604 n.2.
93. See supra note 53 for an explanation of the Seal of Confession.
94. In the Roman Catholic tradition, the Code of Canon Law provides the juridical status
of priest-penitent responsibilities. Several Code provisions address the inviolability of the Seal
of Confession and the consequences of a breach of the Seal. Two provisions establish the
confidentiality of confession: "The sacramental seal is inviolable; therefore, it is a crime for a
confessor in any way to betray a penitent by word or in any other manner or for any reason,"
1983 CODE c.983, § 1, and "Even if every danger of revelation is excluded, a confessor is
absolutely forbidden to use knowledge acquired from confession when it might harm the peni-
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dentiality within a 1500-year-old tradition?95 Can a state statute man-
dating child abuse reporting extinguish that codified tradition regardless
of where the communications occurred? Can a state statute extinguish
that exercise of religion? Can Smith's abandonment of the compelling
state interest test when such religious conduct conflicts with a generally
applicable state statute extinguish the free exercise guarantee? These are
the questions posed by the present gauntlet tossed before the Free Exer-
cise Clause.96
Any statute mandating reporting by Roman Catholic priests97
tent." Md c.984, § 1. One provision establishes the penalties for violation of the Seal: "A
confessor who directly violates the seal of confession incurs an automatic (latae sententiae)
excommunication reserved to the [Apostolic] See; if he does so only indirectly, he is to be
punished in accord with the seriousness of the offense." Id. c.1388, § 1. The consequences of
excommunication include ineligibility for membership: "One who has publicly rejected the
Catholic faith or abandoned ecclesiastical communion or been punished with an imposed or
declared excommunication cannot be validly received into public associations," id. c.316, § 1;
a ban from Holy Communion: "Those who are excommunicated or interdicted after the impo-
sition or declaration of the penalty and others who obstinately persist in manifest grave sin are
not to be admitted to Holy Communion," id. c.915; and other prohibitions:
An excommunicated person is forbidden:
1. to have any ministerial participation in celebrating the Eucharistic Sacrifice or
in any other ceremonies whatsoever of public worship;
2. to celebrate the sacraments and sacramentals and to receive the sacraments;
3. to discharge any ecclesiastical offices, ministries or functions whatsoever, or to
place acts of governance.
Id c.1331, § 1. Additional penalties may be warranted: "If long lasting contumacy or the
seriousness of scandal warrants it, other penalties can be added including dismissal from the
clerical state." Id c.1364, § 2.
95. The Code of Canon Law admits no exceptions to the confidentiality of the
confessional:
Neither the canon nor earlier interpretations admit exceptions to the norm.... No
distinction is made among the matters confessed, whether the sinful action itself or
attendant circumstances, or the acts of satisfaction or penances imposed, etc. The
secrecy concerning the penitent and his or her confession of sins that is to be main-
tained is properly described as total.
CODE OF CANON LAW, supra note 53, at 691. Violation of the Seal of Confession has tradi-
tionally been one of the most severely penalized offenses: "The seriousness of the offense [of
violating the Seal] is clear from the fact that it is one of only five excommunications reserved to
the Holy See." Id at 927.
96. Note that the Court's abandonment of the compelling state interest test is especially
sensitive for religious beliefs not as well-documented or objective as the Roman Catholic Sac-
rament of Penance. See Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1613 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (history of free
exercise doctrine shows harsh impact of majoritarian rule on unpopular or emerging religious
groups). Religious beliefs held by a minority faith are the ones historically most in need of
First Amendment protection. Id.; see also McConnell, supra note 4, at 1516 (noting that
without free exercise protection smaller sects are in danger of assimilation into our "secular-
ized protestant culture").
97. See, eg., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-101(b) (West Supp. 1991) ("Any... cler[ic]...
who has reasonable cause to suspect or believe that any child... has had physical injury or
injuries inflicted upon him ... shall report."); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:29 (1990)
CLERGY AND REPORTING STATUTES
presents the question of how to accommodate an objective exercise of
religion, rather than an instance where "each conscience is a law unto
itself or in which judges weigh the social importance of all laws against
the centrality of all religious beliefs."" The Roman Catholic observance
of the Seal of Confession is not a personal belief, but an historically objec-
tive fact, the violation of which entails the most severe penalties.
The impact of the gauntlet will affect more than the Roman Catho-
lic religion because the Court's response must address both the constitu-
tional guarantees governing religion and the role of religion within our
pluralistic society. Any response that restricts the free exercise of reli-
gion will raise questions about the Court's willingness to afford protec-
tion to religion in the manner that the First Amendment affords
protection to the dissenter;99 the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments to
the criminal defendant;" and the Free Exercise Clause historically af-
forded to the religious minority.101 If-the Smith decision is interpreted as
a delegation of authority to the states to do what they will,' 2 the Court
must confront the fact that religion will not always find redress within
the political process of democratic government.1' Such a failure of the
("Any... priest... having reason to suspect that a child has been abused or neglected shall
report.").
98. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1606. As a matter for conjecture, it would seem that the inappro-
priateness of judicial investigation into various religious practices was at the essence of the
majority decision prompting discontinuance of the compelling state interest test. This practice
would be used most often within minority religions and personal beliefs. Yet, it has been
argued that the historical reason for the Free Exercise Clause was the protection of such mi-
nority religious expressions in the face of insufficient political influence. See generally McCon-
nell, supra note 4, at 1437 (analyzing historical foundation of Free Exercise Clause).
99. See, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990) (upholding right to bum
flag as political expression protected by First Amendment).
100. See, eg., Powell v. Texas, 492 U.S. 680 (1989) (convicted criminal defendant denied
counsel prior to psychiatric evaluation was denied Sixth Amendment right to counsel); United
States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989) (subsequent civil suit by government against convicted
criminal defendant violated Double Jeopardy Clause of Fifth Amendment); Skinner v. Rail-
way Labor Executive's Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (employee drug testing subject to Fourth
Amendment limits on search and seizure).
101. See, e.g., Frazee v. Department of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989) (denial of
unemployment benefits to employee who refused to work on Sunday based on religious beliefs
violated First Amendment Free Exercise Clause).
102. See Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1606.
103. Id. Justice Scalia wrote for the majority that the political process renders "unavoida-
ble" the consequence that those religious practices not widely engaged in will place those prac-
ticing them at a "relative disadvantage" within the political process. Id. However, the
political process encompasses the constitutional guarantee of individual liberty, and it can be
argued that the Free Exercise Clause was intended as a specific guarantee to protect the rights
of minority religions within the political process, thereby promoting pluralism. In sum, state
and federal legislative processes are imbued with First Amendment values and must operate in
tandem with the free exercise guarantee.
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political process is especially likely for those minority religions histori-
cally protected by judicial intervention."
Thus, the challenge presented by the abandonment of the compel-
ling state interest test is a difficult one because the easier accommodation
of religious conduct is gone. The compelling state interest test required
an urgent state goal and a narrowly tailored means to justify the burden
on free exercise. But after Smith, the Court must confront religion di-
rectly and must address the issue of what is religion and what is not, in
order to determine exactly which beliefs and conduct fall within the con-
stitutional protections afforded to free exercise. Religion cannot be de-
nied protection, even if it cannot muster political influence. Neither can
the free exercise of religion be accommodated through a substantial com-
pliance performance, particularly in the case of historical and well-docu-
mented religious practices. For example, a priest cannot keep silent as to
most of a parishioner's confession. No religion is likely to accept such a
halfway point, and for the courts to seek such an accommodation
through a balancing of interests would further entangle the judiciary in
religious inquiries. Thus, the Smith decision has resulted in a gauntlet
pending before the Free Exercise Clause.
II. STATE CHILD ABUSE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
The constitutional issues raised by mandatory child abuse reporting
statutes are framed amidst the emotional trauma surrounding child abuse
and the "fix-it" appeal of the statutes. The proliferation of reporting stat-
utes attests to their political popularity."°5 The state has a compelling
public interest in protecting children, particularly from the trauma of
abuse, which has been manifested by including reporting requirements
among the states' child abuse laws. 106 Some statutes are broad in scope,
104. See McConnell, supra note 4, at 1516.
105. See infra note 106 for a list of state reporting statutes. With the surge of advancing
medical diagnostic techniques in the early 1960s, indications of child abuse became more read-
ily detectable by physicians. See IRVING J. SLOAN, CHILD ABUSE: GOVERNING LAW & LEG-
ISLATION 15 (1983) (enactment of reporting laws coincided with first formalized medical
proffle of abused child and increased awareness of problem); see O'Brien, supra note 18, at 100
(medical advances have made child abuse liability verifiable).
In 1963, the Children's Bureau of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
proposed a statutory framework that would require physicians to report suspected abuse.
CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, THE ABUSED
CHILD: PRINCIPLES AND SUGGESTED LANGUAGE FOR LEGISLATION ON REPORTING OF THE
PHYSICALLY ABUSED CHILD (1963). By 1967, all fifty states had enacted some form of legis-
lation addressing the problem of child abuse with reporting laws. See Mitchell, supra note 55,
at 727. Since then, statutes have been amended to broaden the scope of who must report and
what forms of abuse must be reported. Id.
106. See ALA. CODE §§ 26-14-3, -4 (1986 & Supp. 1990) (mandatory reporting by specified
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professionals, not including clergy, and any person called upon to render aid or medical assist-
ance to child abuse victim); ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.020 (1990) (mandatory reporting by speci-
fied professionals not including clergy); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3620(A), (B), (G) (1989
& Supp. 1990) (mandatory reporting by specified professionals or any person responsible for
care or treatment of children expressly including clergy); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-507
(Michie Supp. 1991) (mandatory reporting by specified professionals not including clergy);
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11165-11166 (West 1982 & Supp. 1991) (mandatory reporting by speci-
fied professionals including religious practitioners who diagnose, examine or treat children);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-304 (Supp. 1990) (mandatory reporting by specified professionals
including Christian Science practitioners); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17a-101(b), -103 (West
Supp. 1991) (mandatory reporting by specified professionals, expressly including clergy, and
any person not specified who has reasonable cause to suspect child abuse or neglect); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 903 (1983) (mandatory reporting by specified professionals, not including
clergy, and any person who suspects child abuse); D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1352 (1989 & Supp.
1991) (mandatory reporting by specified professionals not including clergy); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 415.504 (West 1986 & Supp. 1991) (mandatory reporting by specified professionals and by
any person who suspects child abuse or neglect, but specifically upholding clergy communicant
privilege); GA. CODE ANN. § 74-111 (Harrison 1981 & Supp. 1989) (mandatory reporting by
specified professionals not including clergy); HAw. REV. STAT. § 350-1.1 (1985 & Supp. 1990)
(mandatory reporting by specified professionals not including clergy); IDAHO CODE § 16-1619
(1979 & Supp. 1991) (mandatory reporting by specified professionals, not including clergy, and
any person who suspects child abuse); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, para. 2054 (Smith-Hurd 1988
& Supp. 1991) (mandatory reporting by specified professionals including clergy except Chris-
tian Science practitioners); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-11-3 (Burns 1987 & Supp. 1991)
(mandatory reporting by any person); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.69 (West 1985 & Supp. 1991)
(mandatory reporting by specified professionals not including clergy); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-
1522 (1986 & Supp. 1990) (mandatory reporting by specified professionals not including
clergy); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 620.030, .050(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990) (mandatory
reporting by any person but clergy-penitent privilege provides grounds for refusing to report);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403(B), (C) (West 1986 & Supp. 1991) (mandatory reporting by
specified professionals including clergy except where knowledge acquired during confession or
sacred communication); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4011 (West Supp. 1990) (mandatory
reporting by specified professionals not including clergy); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 5-
704, -705 (1984 & Supp. 1990) (mandatory reporting by specified professionals; mandatory
reporting by any person, but upholding clergy-communicant privilege as grounds not to re-
port); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 51A (West Supp. 1991) (mandatory reporting by
specified professionals not including clergy); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 25.248(3)-(4) (Callaghan
1984 & Supp. 1991) (mandatory reporting by specified professionals not including clergy);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991) (mandatory reporting by specified
professionals including clergy except where reporting violates clergy-communicant privilege);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-21-353 (1981 & Supp. 1991) (mandatory reporting by specified profes-
sionals including clergy and any person who suspects child abuse); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.115
(Vernon 1983 & Supp. 1991) (mandatory reporting by specified professionals not including
clergy); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-201 (1990) (mandatory reporting by specified professionals
including Christian Science practitioners and religious healers); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-711
(1989) (mandatory reporting by specified professionals not including clergy or any other per-
son with reasonable cause to suspect child abuse); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 432B.220 (Michie
1986 & Supp. 1989) (mandatory reporting by specified professionals including clergy unless
knowledge obtained from offender during confession); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:29
(1990 & Supp. 1990) (mandatory reporting by specified professionals including clergy); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.10 (West 1976 & Supp. 1991) (mandatory reporting by any person); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 32-1-15 (Michie 1989 & Supp. 1991) (mandatory reporting by specified profes-
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requiring anyone who suspects child abuse to report. 10 7 Some statutes
specify particular classes of people who must report.108 Most states in-
sionals not including clergy and any person who suspects child abuse); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW
§ 413 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1991) (mandatory reporting by specified professionals includ-
ing Christian Science practitioners); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-543 (1990 & Supp. 1990)
(mandatory reporting by any person or institution that suspects child abuse); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 50-25.1-03 (1989 & Supp. 1991) (mandatory reporting by specified professionals in-
cluding clergy unless knowledge acquired in capacity as spiritual adviser); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2151.42.1 (Anderson 1990 & Supp. 1990) (mandatory reporting by specified profes-
sionals including persons rendering spiritual treatment through prayer in accordance with the
tenets of well-recognized religion); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 846 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991)
(mandatory reporting by specified professionals and any person who suspects child abuse); OR.
REV. STAT. § 418.750 (1987 & Supp. 1990) (mandatory reporting by any public or private
official unless knowledge obtained by privileged communication with psychiatrist, psycholo-
gist, clergy or attorney); 23 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 6311 (Supp. 1991) (mandatory reporting
by specified professionals including Christian Science practitioners and any professional who
has contact with children); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 40-11-3, -11 (1990) (mandatory reporting by
any person and abrogation of all privileges except attorney-client as grounds for failure to
report); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-510, -550 (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1990) (mandatory
reporting by specified professionals including Christian Science practitioners and religious
healers but expressly upholding priest-penitent privilege as grounds for failure to report); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 26-8A-3, -4 (Supp. 1991) (mandatory reporting by specified profes-
sionals including religious healing practitioners and in case of death from child abuse any
person must report); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-403 (1984 & Supp. 1990) (mandatory report-
ing by specified professionals, not including clergy, and any person who has reason to know or
renders aid to child abuse victim); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 34.01 (West 1986 & Supp. 1991)
(mandatory reporting by any person); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4-503 (1989 & Supp. 1990)
(mandatory reporting by any person including clergy unless sole source of information is per-
petrator's confession); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 4913 (Supp. 1990) (mandatory reporting by
specified professionals not including clergy); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.3 (Michie 1987 &
Supp. 1990) (mandatory reporting by specified professionals including Christian Science prac-
titioners); WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.030 (West 1986 & Supp. 1991) (mandatory report-
ing by specified professionals not including clergy); W. VA. CODE § 49-6A-2 (1986)
(mandatory reporting by specified professionals including Christian Science practitioners and
religious healers); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 48.981(2) (West 1987 & Supp. 1990) (mandatory report-
ing by specified professionals not including clergy); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-205 (Michie
1986 & Supp. 1991) (mandatory reporting by any person); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 8, § 406
(Supp. 1988) (mandatory reporting by specified professionals not including clergy); V.I. CODE
ANN. tit. 5, § 2533 (Supp. 1990) (mandatory reporting by specified professionals not including
clergy).
107. For example, the Delaware statute states: "Any physician, and any other person in the
healing arts including any person licensed to render services in medicine, osteopathy, dentistry,
any intern, resident, nurse, school employee, social worker, psychologist, medical examiner or
any other person who knows or reasonably suspects child abuse or neglect shall make a report."
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 § 903 (1983) (emphasis added).
108. For example, the Colorado statute requires reporting by a typically detailed list of
specified professionals:
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clude a permissive reporting provision, stating that any person not in-
cluded under the mandatory provision may report suspected abuse. 1° 9
A. Achieving the State's Purpose of Protecting Children From Abuse
Generally, all fifty states express a similar purpose for their report-
ing statutes: the protection of children. 11 The express terms of the stat-
Persons required to report such abuse or neglect or circumstances or conditions shall
include any:
(a) Physician or surgeon, including a physician in training;
(b) Child health associate;





(h) Chiropodist or podiatrist;
(i) Registered nurse or licensed practical nurse;
(j) Hospital personnel engaged in the admission, care, or treatment of patients;
(k) Christian Science practitioner;
(1) Public or private school official or employee;
(m) Social worker or worker in family care home, employer-sponsored on-site
child care center, or child care center as defined in section 26-6-102, C.R.S.;





(s) Peace officer as defined in section 18-1-901(3)(1), C.R.S.;
(t) Pharmacist;
(u) Commercial film and photographic print processor as provided in subsection
(2.5) of this section.
COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-3-304 (Supp. 1990); see also CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11165-11166
(West 1982 & Supp. 1991) (stating that any child care custodian, health practitioner or em-
ployee of child protective agency shall report known or suspected cases of child abuse).
109. For example the Arkansas statute has both a mandatory reporting provision, ARK.
CODE ANN. § 12-12-507(b) (Michie 1991), and a permissive provision which allows reporting
by any other person: "Anyperson with reasonable cause to suspect child maltreatment, or that
a child has died as a result of child maltreatment, or who observes a child being subjected to
conditions or circumstances which would reasonably result in child maltreatment, may imme-
diately notify central intake or law enforcement." Id § 12-12-507(a) (Michie 1991) (emphasis
added); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 11166 (West 1982 & Supp. 1991).
110. For example, the Alaska statute states:
In order to protect children whose health and well-being may be adversely affected
through the infliction, by other than accidental means, of harm through physical
injury or neglect, mental injury, sexual abuse, sexual exploitation, or maltreatment,
the legislature requires the reporting of these cases by practitioners of the healing arts
and others to the department.... It is the intent of the legislature that, as a result of
these reports, protective services will be made available in an effort to (1) prevent
further harm to the child; (2) safeguard and enhance the general well-being of the
children in this state; and (3) preserve family life unless that effort is likely to result in
physical or emotional damage to the child.
ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.010 (1990) (emphasis added).
Although each state defines its purpose differently, all fifty states use similar terms and the
purposes are essentially identical. This purpose, however, is not always manifested in state
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utes make it obvious that the reporting requirements are intended to
initiate preventative measures by proper authorities to guard against fu-
ture abuse."1 I In addition to providing safeguards for children, these re-
porting statutes are aimed at protecting the integrity of the family
unit. 11 2 It follows, then, that reporting provisions are designed to ensure
that children can develop normally through growth in a proper mental,
physical and emotional atmosphere.
In light of these purposes, when the abuser of a child is one or both
of the child's parents, the state should also have an interest in ensuring
that the parent receive either therapy or some other form of support to
facilitate returning the child to an integrated family atmosphere. Con-
sider the situation where parents have confessed to a cleric that they have
abused, or will abuse again, their own child. 3 Under the mandates of
the state reporting requirement, 4 the cleric would have to report the
situation to the proper authorities. Aside from religious doctrinal
prohibitions against reporting the case, 1 5 theoretical reservations arise as
well. Presumably, the parents are seeking spiritual guidance in order to
discontinue the abuse.1 16 They have expressed a wish to seek reconcilia-
tion according to religious tenets, and in order to do so must make a
good faith effort to cease the abusive actions. The very act of "confess-
ing" is a means for these parents to treat the problem individually. Fur-
thermore, the penitential rite is a means to reestablish an integrated
family atmosphere in which the child can develop.
In such an instance, the end furthered by a religious practice con-
forms with the state purpose underlying reporting statutes. However, if
the parents anticipated that the cleric would report their confidences to
the authorities, it is unlikely that they would confess and seek this reli-
action, as shown by the state's lack of involvement in certain cases, such as the case of Joshua
DeShaney. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
See infra notes 235-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of the DeShaney case.
111. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.010 (1990) (intent of legislature to prevent further
harm to child).
112. See id.
113. See, eg., State v. Motherwell, 788 P.2d 1066, 1067 (Wash. 1990). See supra notes 29-
40 and accompanying text for a discussion of the facts in Motherwell.
114. For purposes of this example, the state requirement will be one which would require
the priest to report any suspected case of child abuse. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 17a-101(b) (West Supp. 1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:29 (1990 & Supp. 1990).
115. At least in the Roman Catholic faith, a priest who breaks the confidentiality of the
confessional will be excommunicated. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Seal of Confession and the Code of Canon Law.
116. See infra notes 206-09 and accompanying text for a discussion of clergy qualifications
to counsel in cases of child abuse.
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gious means to resolution. 17 Requiring the cleric to report in this
situation may be counter-productive because reporting would discourage
a process that may lead to the end of the abuse and promotion of family
healing. In such a case, the objective religious practice of the Sacrament
of Penance also serves a socially desirable purpose, and a court may more
readily conclude that the conduct is protected under the
First Amendment.
B. Elements and Conditions in Child Abuse Reporting Statutes
Child abuse reporting statutes differ according to who must re-
port,"1 ' who may report,119 and what must be reported. 120 Statutes also
117. Researchers have recently reported that a Maryland law mandating psychotherapists
to report child abuse deters abusers from seeking treatment. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-
704 (1984 & Supp. 1990) (mandatory reporting by health practitioners, police officers, educa-
tors and human service workers). According to a study conducted at the Johns Hopkins Sex-
ual Disorders Clinic, the Maryland law "frustrates therapists' ability to detect and intervene in
active pedophilia... because abusers' fear of prosecution keeps them from admitting their
actions." Paul W. Valentine, Maryland Child Abuse Law Called Deterrent to Treatment,
WASH. POST, Apr. 12, 1991, at A9. Statistics revealed in the study showed that 73 child
abusers voluntarily sought help at the Sexual Disorders Clinic from 1979 to 1989; however,
since July 1989, when the Maryland law became effective, no child abusers have voluntarily
sought treatment at the clinic. Id. "Now, without the assurance of confidentiality under the
reporting requirement and the reluctance of patients to disclose their activity,... it is more
difficult to intervene. An unknown number of children may be jeopardized." Id. (quoting
Fred S. Berlin, Director, Johns Hopkins Sexual Disorders Clinic).
118. See JOHN C. BUSH & WILLIAM H. TiEMANN, THE RIGHT TO SILENCE: PRIVILEGED
CLERGY COMMUNICATION AND THE LAw 249-56 (3d ed. 1989) (some state statutes require
any person to report, while others designate particular classes of people such as "clergy,"
"Christian Science practitioners," "marriage and family counselors" or "religious healers and
counselors").
119. See id. (most states allow "any person with reasonable cause to suspect abuse or ne-
glect" to report).
120. Generally, all states require similar information in reporting. For example, the Ala-
bama statute states:
The reports provided for in this chapter shall state, if known, the name of the child,
his [or her] whereabouts, the names and addresses of the parents, guardian or care-
taker and the character and extent of his [or her] injuries. The written report shall
also contain, if known, any evidence of previous injuries to said child and any other
pertinent information which might establish the cause of such injury or injuries, and
the identity of the person or persons responsible for the same.
ALA. CODE § 26-14-5 (1986).
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impose various penalties for failure to report, 2 and some recognize cer-
tain privileges not to report.1
22
1. Who must report
Not all statutes have the same requirements for who must report.'23
In general, the statutes require reporting from classes of people who hold
positions that would make them aware of instances of child abuse. For
example, because physicians are likely to diagnose and suspect child
abuse, they are required to report such abuse in all fifty states.
24 Most
states require reports from health care providers, educators, law enforce-
ment officers, and social workers, since these professionals also have
much contact with children. 2 Eight states expressly require reports
from clergy.'26 Fifteen states envelop all of these groups, including
121. Most states classify the failure to report as a misdemeanor, punishable by no more
than six months in jail or by a fine of not more than $500.00. See, eg., ALA. CODE § 26-14-13
(1986 & Supp. 1990).
The Arkansas statute imposes civil liability for failure to report, stating: "Any person,
official, or institution required... to make notification of suspected child maltreatment who
willfully fails to do so, shall be civilly liable for damages proximately caused by that failure."
ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-504(b) (Michie Supp. 1991).
122. For example, the Maryland reporting statute expressly upholds the clergy-communi-
cant privilege:
A minister of the gospel, cler[ic], or priest of an established church of any denomina-
tion is not required to provide notice [of child abuse or neglect] if the notice would
disclose matter in relation to any communication described in [the clergy-communi-
cant privilege statute] and:
(i) the communication was made to the minister, cler[ic], or priest in a profes-
sional character in the course of discipline enjoined by the church to which the min-
ister, cler[ic], or priest belongs; and
(ii) the minister, cler[ic], or priest is bound to maintain the confidentiality of that
communication under canon law, church doctrine, or practice.
MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-705(a)(3) (Supp. 1990). But cf BUSH & TEMANN, supra
note 118, at 249-56 (listing privileges abrogated by each state statute).
123. See BusH & TIEMANN, supra note 118, at 249-56.
124. See Mitchell, supra note 55, at 728. In recent years there has been a growing public
and professional awareness of child abuse. As a result the spectrum of abuse being reported
has broadened compared to the last decade. Marshall et al., supra note 22, at 664. "[M]ore
children are being brought for evaluation, sexual abuse is the most frequent complaint and
most often involves preschoolers, and more clinically subtle abuse is being seen." Id.
125. See Mitchell, supra note 55, at 728.
126. ARIz. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3620(A), (G) (1989 & Supp. 1990) ("Any ... cler[ic] or
priest.., shall immediately report [information regarding child abuse or neglect] .... Noth-
ing... discharges a cler[ic] or priest from the duty to report."); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN,
§ 17a-101(b) (West Supp. 1991) ("Any ... cler[ic], . . . shall report or cause a report to be
made."); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403(B), (C) (West 1986 & Supp. 1991) ("priest, rabbi,
[and] duly ordained minister" qualifies as "mandatory reporter" who must report abuse unless
knowledge was acquired "during a confession or other sacred communication."); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 626.556(3)(a) (West Supp. 1991) ("A person... shall immediately report.., if the
person is: ... (2) employed as a member of the clergy and received the information while
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clergy, by simply requiring any person who suspects child abuse to report
it. 127
Most states use a central registry to track reports of child abuse and
assure that all reports remain confidential. 128 Also, some give reporters
immunity from any civil or criminal liability that might otherwise result
from reporting suspected child abuse, providing they act in good faith. 129
engaged in ministerial duties, provided that a member of the clergy is not required. . . to
report information that is otherwise privileged."); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-21-353(1) (1981 &
Supp. 1991) ("Any... minister... shall cause an oral report to be made immediately by
telephone or otherwise and followed as soon thereafter as possible by a report in writing.");
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 432B.220(2) (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1989) ("Reports must be made
by... [a] cler[ic], practitioner of Christian Science or religious healer, unless he [or she] has
acquired the knowledge of the abuse or neglect from the offender during a confession."); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:29 (1990 & Supp. 1990) ("Any... priest, minister, or rabbi...
shall report."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4-503(3) (1989 & Supp. 1990) ("If a cler[ic] or priest
receives information about abuse or neglect from any source other than confession of the per-
petrator, he [or she] is required to give notification.").
127. For example, the Mississippi statute states:
Any attorney, physician, dentist, intern, resident, nurse, psychologist, teacher, social
worker, school principal, child care giver, minister, law enforcement officer, or any
other person having reasonable cause to suspect that a child brought to him [or her]...
is a neglected child or an abused child, shall cause an oral report to be made
immediately.
MIss. CODE ANN. § 43-21-353(1) (1972 & Supp. 1991) (emphasis added); see also ALA. CODE
§ 26-14-3 (1986 & Supp. 1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 903 (1983); IDAHO CODE § 16-
1619 (1979 & Supp. 1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-11-3 (Burns 1987 & Supp. 1991); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 28-711 (1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.10 (West 1976 & Supp. 1991); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 32-1-15 (Michie 1989 & Supp. 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-543 (1990 & Supp.
1990); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 846 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-3
(1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-8A-4 (Supp. 1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-403
(1984 & Supp. 1990); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 34.01 (West 1986 & Supp. 1991); Wyo. STAT.
ANN. § 14-3-205(a) (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1991).
128. For example, the Alabama statute states:
(a) The state department of human resources shall establish a statewide central regis-
try for reports of child abuse and neglect made pursuant to .... (b) The state depart-
ment of human resources shall establish and enforce reasonable rules and regulations
governing the custody, use and preservation of the reports and records of child abuse
and neglect.... The reports and records of child abuse and neglect shall be confiden-
tial, and shall not be used or disclosed for any [other] purpose.
ALA. CODE § 26-14-8 (1975 & Supp. 1990); see also COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 19-3-307, -313
(Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.504 (West 1986 & Supp. 1991); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:403 (West 1986 & Supp. 1991); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 51F (West Supp.
1991); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-213 (Michie 1986).
129. See, eg., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556(4) (West 1983 & Supp 1991). The Minnesota
statutd provides in pertinent part:
(a) The following persons are immune from any civil or criminal liability that other-
wise might result from their actions, if they are acting in good faith:
(1) any person making a voluntary or mandated report under subdivision 3
[which includes clergy] ... or assisting in an assessment under this section... ;
(c) This subdivision does not provide immunity to any person for failure to make a
required report or for committing neglect, physical abuse, or sexual abuse of a child.
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In addition to criminal penalties for failure to report suspected cases of
child abuse, 30 the reporter may face civil liability for failure to report
under a negligence or a malpractice cause of action as well.131 For exam-
ple, in Landeros v. Flood 132 the California Supreme Court upheld the
liability of a physician for negligently failing to diagnose a case of bat-
tered child syndrome and subsequently failing to report it.'33
2. Privileges and abrogations
Many reporting statutes recognize either a confidential communica-
tion privilege within the reporting law itself' 34 or expressly abrogate one
or all privileges.' 35 Most statutes eliminate the physician-patient and the
husband-wife privileges. 36 Other statutes specifically abolish the privi-
lege of psychotherapists, 137 psychologists, 138 registered nurses, 139 social
Id.
130. See, eg., ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-504(b) (Michie Supp. 1991); see supra note 121
and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 121 for the text of the Arkansas statute.
132. 17 Cal. 3d 399, 551 P.2d 389, 131 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1976).
133. Id. at 412, 551 P.2d at 396, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 76. But see Fischer v. Metcalf, 543 So.
2d 785, 786 (Fla. 1989) (dismissing claims by mother and daughter against father's psychiatrist
who failed to report child abuse pursuant to Florida reporting statute).
134. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-14-8 (1986 & Supp. 1990); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
3620(F) (1989 & Supp. 1990).
135. See BUSH & TIEMANN, supra note 118, at 249-56. For example, Pennsylvania abro-
gates all privileges: "The privileged communication between any professional person required
to report and the patient or client of that person shall not apply to situations involving child
abuse and shall not constitute grounds for failure to report as required by this chapter." 23
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 631 l(a) (Supp. 1991). New Hampshire, on the other hand, abrogates
certain privileges, but not the attorney-client privilege: "The privileged quality of communica-
tion between husband and wife and any professional person and his [or her] patient or client,
except that between attorney and client, shall not apply to proceedings instituted pursuant to
this chapter and shall not constitute grounds for failure to report as required by this chapter."
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:32 (1990) (emphasis added).
136. See BUSH & TIEMANN, supra note 118, at 249-56. In a recent case involving a four-
year-old boy who was scalded in an outdoor barbecue pit by his stepfather for not being able to
count to ten, the boy's father was incarcerated for 18 months. Maryland Stepfather Is Given
18-Month Term for Abuse, WASH. Posr, Nov. 29, 1990, at A35. The mother served the same
length of time for failure to intercede on the boy's behalf even though the father was convicted
of the more serious crime of child abuse. Id. In addition to being guilty for failure to report,
the mother in this case would also have to testify against her husband upon abrogation of the
husband-wife privilege. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-705 (Michie 1984 & Supp. 1991)
(requires any person who suspects child abuse to report and supersedes privileged communica-
tion statutes).
137. See, eg., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 51A (West Supp. 1991).
138. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-411 (1984 & Supp. 1990).
139. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-304(2)(i) (Supp. 1990).
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workers"4 and school counselors. a14 Four states nullify all privileges, 42
while eleven additional states abrogate all privileges except the attorney-
client privilege. 43 Regarding the clergy privilege, some states draw a
distinction between abrogating the privilege for reporting as opposed to
testifying at a proceeding resulting from a report. 1" In other states, the
140. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 51A-F (West Supp. 1991).
141. For example, the South Dakota statute states in part: "Any... school counselor [or]
school official... [having] reasonable cause to suspect that a child... has been abused or
neglected shall report that information." S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-8A-3 (Supp. 1991).
142. For example, the Georgia statute states:
Suspected child abuse which is required to be reported by any person pursuant to this
Code section shall be reported notwithstanding that the reasonable cause to believe
such abuse has occurred or is occurring is based in whole or in part upon any com-
munication to that person which is otherwise made privileged or confidential by law.
GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-5(g) (Harrison 1990); see also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, para. 2054
(Smith-Hurd 1988 & Supp. 1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-201(4) (1990); 23 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 6311 (Supp. 1991).
143. See ALA. CODE § 26-14-10 (1986); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-518 (Michie Supp.
1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 908 (1983 & Supp. 1990); KY. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 620.050(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.140 (Vernon 1983 & Supp.
1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:32 (1990); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-10 (1989); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 40-11-11 (1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-614 (1991); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 34.04 (West 1986); W. VA. CODE § 49-6A-7 (1986).
144. Arizona, for example, mandates that a cleric report suspected cases of abuse, but does
not allow a cleric to reveal confidential information as a witness in a proceeding resulting from
the report. The Arizona statute states:
In any civil or criminal litigation in which a child's neglect, dependency, abuse or
abandonment is an issue, a cler[ic] or priest shall not, without his [or her] consent, be
examined as a witness concerning any confession made to him [or her] in his [or her]
role as a cler[ic] or a priest in the course of the discipline enjoined by the church to
which he [or she] belongs. Nothing in this subsection discharges a cler[ic] or priest
from the duty to report pursuant to subsection A of this section.
ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3620(G) (1989 & Supp. 1990).
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privilege not to report is expressly eliminated.1 45 Some states expressly
maintain the integrity of the clergy privilege.
1 4 6
145. In addition to the four states that abrogate all privileges, see supra note 142, the clergy
privilege is specifically abrogated in Arizona, Nevada, Utah and Washington. Id.; NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 432B.220(2)(d) (Miechie 1986 & Supp. 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4-503
(1989 & Supp. 1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.060(3) (1990).
Nevada and Utah, however, recognize the clergy privilege within the confines of the con-
fessional. Under the Nevada statute, reports must be made by the following persons who, in
their professional or occupational capacities, know or have reason to believe that a child has
been abused or neglected: "[a] cler[ic] ... unless he [or she] has acquired the knowledge of the
abuse or neglect from the offender during a confession." NEv. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 432B.220(2)(d) (emphasis added). Note that this statute would not protect communications
such as those in State v. Motherwell, because the communication was not made by the offender.
State v. Motherwell, 788 P.2d 1066, 1067 (Wash. 1990). See supra notes 29-40 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of the Motherwell case. Under section 49.255 of the Nevada law,
"[a] cler[ic] or priest shall not, without the consent of the person making the confession, be
examined as a witness as to any confession made to him [or her] in his [or her] professional
character." NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49.255 (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1990). Section 432B.250
abrogates the clergy privilege, however, concerning both reporting the suspected abuse and
testifying during a proceeding resulting from a report of abuse:
Any person required to report under [Nev. Rev. Stat.] 432B.220 may not invoke any
of the privileges granted under chapter 49 of NRS:
1. For his [or her] failure to report as required under NRS 432B.220;
2. In cooperating with an agency which provides protective services or a guard-
ian ad litem for a child; or
3. In any proceeding held pursuant to NRS 432B.410 to 432B.590, inclusive.
Id.
Similarly, Utah respects the clergy privilege within the context of the Seal of Confession.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4-503. The Utah statute states:
The notification requirements .. do not apply to a cler[ic] or priest, without the
consent of the person making the confession, with regard to any confession made to
him [or her] in his [or her] professional character in the course of discipline enjoined
by the church to which he [or she] belongs, ifi
(a) the confession was made directly to the cler[ic] or priest by the perpetrator;
and
(b) the cler[ic] or priest is, under canon law or church doctrine or practice,
bound to maintain the confidentiality of that confession.
Ifa clerfic] or priest receives information about abuse or neglect from any source
other than confession of the perpetrator, he [or she] is required to give notification on
the basis of that information even though he [or she] may have also received a report of
abuse or neglect from the confession of the perpetrator.
Id. (emphasis added). However, the limiting language of the statute would not protect com-
munications such as those made in Motherwell where the reports of sexual abuse were made by
a third party, not the offender. Motherwell, 788 P.2d at 1067; see supra notes 29-40.
Finally, the Washington child abuse reporting statute states that reporting by clergy does
not violate the clergy privilege. WASH. REV. CODE ANN § 26.44.060(3). On its face, the
Washington evidentiary privilege statute addresses the competency of witnesses to testify in
judicial proceedings. Id. § 5.60.060(3) (West 1963 & Supp. 1991).
146. For example, the Florida statute states:
The privileged quality of communication between husband and wife and between any
professional person and his [or her] patient or client, and any other privileged com-
munication except that between attorney and client [or confidential communications
to clergy in their capacity as spiritual advisors], as such communication relates both
to the competency of the witness and to the exclusion of confidential communica-
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III. THE CLERGY-COMMUNICANT EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGE
Forty-nine states and the District of Columbia recognize the clergy-
communicant privilege in their evidence laws. 47 Notwithstanding the
distinction between a privilege from testifying about confidential commu-
nications and a privilege from reporting them, twenty-five states have
reporting statutes that include the clergy. 4 ' Recognizing a clergy-com-
tions, shall not apply to any situation involving known or suspected child abuse or
neglect and shall not constitute grounds for failure to report as required ... or failure
to give evidence in any judicial proceeding relating to child abuse or neglect.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.512 (West 1986).
147. ALA. CODE § 12-21-166 (1986 & Siipp. 1990); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2233
(1982 & Supp. 1990) (civil); id. § 13-4062(3) (1989 & Supp. 1990) (criminal); ARK. R. EVID.
505; CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 912, 917, 1030-1034 (West 1966 & Supp. 1990); COLO. REv. STAT.
§ 13-90-107(c) (1987 & Supp. 1989); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-146(b) (West Supp. 1991);
DEL. R. EVID. 505; D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-309 (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.505 (West 1979
& Supp. 1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 38-419.1 (Harrison 1981 & Supp. 1989); HAw. R. EVID.
506; IDAHO CODE § 9-203(3) (1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 8-803 (Smith-Hurd
1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-14-5 (Burns 1986 & Supp. 1990); IowA CODE ANN. § 622.10
(West 1950 & Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-429 (1983 & Supp. 1989); Ky. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 421.210(4) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1972 & Supp. 1990); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 13:3734.1 (West 1991) (civil); i. §§ 15:477 to :478 (West 1981 & Supp. 1991) (criminal);
ME. R. EVID. 505; MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-111 (1989); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 233, § 20A (West 1986 & Supp. 1991); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.2156 (Callaghan
1986 & Supp. 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(i)(c) (West 1988); Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-
1-22 (Supp. 1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.060(4) (Vernon 1952 & Supp. 1991); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 26-1-804 (1989); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-506 (1989); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49.255
(Michie 1986 & Supp. 1990); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 516:35 (Supp. 1990) (clergy generally);
id. § 330-A:16-c (1984 & Supp. 1990) (certified pastoral counselors); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:84A-23 (West 1976); N.M. R. EVID. 11-506; N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 4505 (McKinney
1963 & Supp. 1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.2 (1986 & Supp. 1990); N.D. R. EVID. 505;
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2317.02(C) (Anderson 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2505
(West 1980 & Supp. 1991); OR. REv. STAT. § 40.260 (1989); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5943
(1982 & Supp. 1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-17-23 (1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-90 (Law.
Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 19-13-16 to -18 (1987); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 24-1-206 (1980 & Supp. 1990); TEX. R. CIV. EvID. 505, TEX. R. CliM. EVID.
505; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-24-8(3) (1987 & Supp. 1990); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1607
(1973); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-400 (Michie 1984 & Supp. 1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 5.60.060(3) (West 1963 & Supp. 1991); W. VA. CODE § 57-3-9 (Supp. 1991); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 905.06 (West 1975); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-12-101(a)(ii) (Michie 1988 & Supp. 1991).
148. The form of these statutes varies. Some specify that clergy must report, ARIz. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 13-3620(A) (Supp. 1990); COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-3-304 (Supp. 1990); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-101(b) (West Supp. 1991); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:403(B) (West
1986 & Supp. 1991); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-353 (1981 & Supp. 1991); NEv. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 432B.220 (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1990); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:29 (1990 &
Supp. 1990); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-03 (1989 & Supp. 1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-
4-503 (1989 & Supp. 1990); W. VA. CODE § 49-6A-2 (1986). Some imply that clergy must
report, e.g., 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 631 la (Supp. 1991). Some include clergy by requiring
any person to report, ALA. CODE § 26-14-3 (1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 903 (1983);
IDAHO CODE § 16-1619(a) (1979 & Supp. 1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-11-3 (Burns 1987 &
Supp. 1990); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-711 (1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.10 (West 1976 &
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municant evidentiary privilege may conflict with a statutory requirement
that clergy report suspected cases of child abuse.'49
The clergy-communicant privilege has roots beyond the evidentiary,
civil and criminal provisions in which it is currently embodied. Tradi-
tionally the privilege has been recognized in the Code of Canon Law,"'
Supp. 1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-15 (Michie 1989 & Supp. 1990); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 7A-543 (1990 & Supp. 1990); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 846 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-3 (1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-8A-4 (Supp. 1991) (re-
quires "any person" to report only if death ensues); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-403 (1984 &
Supp. 1990); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 34.01 (West 1986 & Supp. 1991); Wyo. STAT. ANN.
§ 14-3-205 (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1991). Some abrogate the clergy privilege. ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-3620(G) (expressly abrogates clergy-communicant privilege as grounds for
not reporting); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 908 (1983) (abrogates all privileges except attorney-
client as grounds to exclude evidence at child abuse proceedings); IDAHO CODE § 16-1620
(1979 & Supp. 1991) (expressly abrogates clergy privilege as grounds to exclude evidence at
child abuse proceedings); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 432B.250, .255 (Michie 1986) (abrogates
all privileges for persons required to report and as grounds to exclude evidence); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 169-C:32 (1990) (abrogates all privileges except attorney-client as grounds for
failure to report); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-11 (1990) (abrogates all privileges except attorney-
client as grounds for failure to report or testify in child abuse proceedings); TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 34.04 (West 1986 & Supp. 1991) (abrogates all privileges except attorney-client as
grounds to exclude evidence in child abuse proceedings); W. VA. CODE § 49-6A-7 (1986) (ab-
rogates all privileges except attorney-client in situations involving child abuse); Wyo. STAT.
§ 14-3-210 (1986 & Supp. 1991) (abrogates all privileges except attorney-client and physician-
patient as grounds to exclude evidence in child abuse proceedings).
149. Such a conflict arises when the state requires the reporting of child abuse, yet also
grants a privilege of confidentiality. For example, Mississippi law requires "[a]ny... minister
... or any other person having reasonable cause to suspect that a child.., is a neglected child
or an abused child ... [to] cause an oral report to be made immediately." Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 43-21-353 (1981 & Supp. 1990). Contra MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-22 (Supp. 1990) (allowing
clergy-communicant privilege). The Mississippi evidentiary privilege states in part:
(2) A person has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent another from disclos-
ing a confidential communication by the person to a cler[ic] in his [or her] profes-
sional character as spiritual advisor.
(3) The privilege may be claimed by the person, by his [or her] guardian or conserva-
tor, or by his [or her] personal representative if deceased. The cler[ic] shall claim the
privilege on behalf of the person unless the privilege is waived.
Id.
Similar language is used in NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-711 (1989) (requiring any person to
report), and id. § 27-506 (1989) (allowing clergy privilege); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 169-
C:29, :32 (1990) (requiring priests, ministers and rabbis to report and abrogating all privileges
except attorney-client privilege), and id. § 516:35 (Supp. 1990) (respecting clergy privilege);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.10 (West 1976 & Supp. 1991) (requiring any person to report), and
id. § 2A:84A-23 (West 1976 & Supp. 1991) (forbidding disclosure of confidential communica-
tions made to cleric); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 846 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991) (mandating
reports by every person having reason to believe child has been abused), and id. tit. 12, § 2505
(West 1980 & Supp. 1991) (respecting clergy privilege).
150. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text; see generally Marie Breitenbeck, The
Canonical Tradition of Confidentiality Pertaining to Oral Communications, in CONFIDENTIAL-
ITY IN THE UNITED STATES: A LEGAL AND CANONICAL STUDY 93 (Canon Law Society of
America 1988) (surveying tradition of confidentiality under Canon Law).
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and these roots support the duty of clergy to maintain the confidentiality
of communications made during religious practices despite the threat of
criminal prosecution.
A. Historical Roots of the Privilege
The clergy-communicant privilege originated with the Seal of Con-
fession: "' "The sacramental seal is inviolable; therefore, it is a crime for
a confessor in any way to betray a penitent by word or in any other
manner or for any reason."" 2 The 1983 revised Code of Canon Law
heightens the significance of the confidential nature of the confessional by
using the phrase "it is a crime for a confessor to betray a penitent"15 3 in
contrast to the 1917 Code, which stated less stringently that the confes-
sor was "carefully to guard against" betraying the penitent. 54 Regard-
less of the phrase used to express the seriousness of a priest's obligation
of secrecy, the Code of Canon Law establishes that the Seal is all encom-
passing and contains no exceptions.1 55 All matters that fall within the
Seal of Confession are sacrosanct; those privy to its sanctity are consum-
mately bound to secrecy. 56
Canon 1388 addresses the seriousness of the secrecy obligation sur-
rounding the Seal of Confession: "A confessor who directly violates the
Seal of Confession incurs an automatic (latae sententiae) excommunica-
tion reserved to the Apostolic See; if he does so only indirectly, he is to be
punished in accord with the seriousness of the offense."1 57 Because of
the seriousness and sanctity of the transaction taking place within the
Seal of Confession, the breaking of the Seal has traditionally been one of
the most severely penalized offenses within the Code.'
51
English law recognized the Seal of Confession from the time of the
Norman Conquest in 1066 until the English Reformation in the sixteenth
151. See 1983 CODE c.1388, §§ 1-2; id. c.983, §§ 1-2; id. c.984, §§ 1-2. See supra note 94
for the full text of these canons.
152. 1983 CODE c.983, § 1.
153. Id.
154. 1917 CODE C.889, §§ 1-2.
155. See Breitenbeck, supra note 150, at 95.
156. See supra notes 94-95 for a discussion of the pertinent provisions in the Code of Canon
Law.
157. 1983 CODE c.1388, § 1. The 1917 Code chapter 2368 suggested lesser penalties against
the confessor who violated the Seal of Confession only indirectly such as suspension from
celebrating the Eucharist or suspension or deprivation of the privilege of hearing confessions.
See Breitenbeck, supra note 150, at 99.
158. See Thomas Green, Title IMk Usurpation of Ecclesiastical Functions and Offenses in
Their Exercise (cc. 1378-1389), in THE CODE OF CANON LAW, supra note 53, at 924, 927
("seriousness of the offense is clear from the fact that it is one of only five excommunications
reserved to the Holy See").
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century. 159 The sanctity of the confessional was not respected after the
Reformation.1 "o As a result of this break with tradition, the Seal of Con-
fession was not an authority recognized by the founders of this coun-
try.161 Thus, most American courts required that any privilege of
confidentiality to protect priest-penitent communications be imposed by
statute. 6 2 Oddly enough, in 1813 the first American case to recognize
such a clergy privilege based the privilege not on common law or statu-
tory grounds, but on constitutional grounds. 6 3
A New York court in People v. Philips 6 recognized the clergy-
communicant privilege for a Catholic priest.' 6  Four years later, how-
ever, the privilege was not extended to a Protestant minister. 66 Thus
began the denominational debate over the recognition of the privilege,
the definition of "minister," and the legislative attempt to officiate.' 67
The clergy privilege appeared in federal common law as early as
1875,161 and was reaffirmed in 1958 in Mullen v. United States. 69 In
Mullen, the court not only recognized the clergy privilege, but also ad-
dressed the denominational and situational dilemma of when to apply the
159. See Mitchell, supra note 55, at 736.
160. Id. at 737.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See SAMPSON, supra note 4, for a participating attorney's report of the 1813 New York
case of People v. Philips, N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. (1813).
164. N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. (1813).
165. McConnell, supra note 4, at 1411.
166. See People v. Smith, 2 Rogers NY City Hall Rec. 77, 80 (1817).
167. The New York legislature was the first to statutorily recognize the clergy privilege in
1828, and other states were soon to follow. See Mitchell, supra note 55, at 737.
168. See Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875) (recognizing theory of clergy
privilege in dicta).
169. 263 F.2d 275, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (Fahy, J., concurring).
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privilege.17 ° Today, the privilege is embodied in federal common law171
as well as in Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
1 72
B. Clergy's Entitlement to Invoke the Privilege
Clergy privilege statutes vary as to their focus. Some center on the
individuals who can qualify under the definition of clergy, and others
concentrate on what situations qualify as confidential communica-
tions. 173 Many problems of interpretation arise as a result of the defini-
tions which set the boundaries for the scope of each statute. Similarly,
case law addresses two main issues: (1) whether a given person, or class
of people, qualifies to invoke the privilege; 74 and (2) whether the situa-
tion in which the privilege is invoked qualifies under the statute, regard-
less of the privilege claimant's status. 17
5
170. Id. at 276 (Fahy, J., concurring). Justice Fahy wrote in his concurrence:
Was the disclosure of appellant to the minister a confidential confession to a spiritual
advisor? The answer would be clearer were the relationship of priest and penitent
involved, where the priest is known to be bound to silence by the discipline and laws
of his church.... But I think the privilege if it exists includes a confession by a
penitent to a minister in his capacity as such to obtain such spiritual aid as was
sought and held out.
Id. at 277.
171. See, eg., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 45 (1980) (recognizing importance of
priest-penitent privilege); United States v. Luther, 481 F.2d 429, 432 (9th Cir. 1973) (corpora-
tion not protected by priest-penitent privilege because not natural person); United States v.
Wells, 446 F.2d 2, 4 (2d Cir. 1971) (holding letter to priest not within ambit of privilege
because purpose was not to obtain religious or other counseling, advice, solace, absolution or
ministration); In re Verplank, 329 F. Supp. 433, 435 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (holding draft counsel-
ing services performed by priest fell within scope of privilege); In re Contemporary Mission,
Inc., 44 B.R. 940, 943 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1984) (holding priests employed by corporation not
immune from testifying as to corporation's religious functions under federal rules).
172. FED. R. EVID. 501. Rule 501 states:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by
Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivi-
sion thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be
interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience.
However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or
defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness,
person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in ac-
cordance with State law.
Id. Congress opted for this broader and more flexible rule, rather than specifying instances of
privileged communications, because it allows for an ad hoc development of the privilege. See
Mitchell, supra note 55, at 739.
173. See supra note 147 for a compilation of clergy-communicant evidentiary privilege laws.
174. See, eg., Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275, 277-80 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (Fahy, J.,
concurring); Eckmann v. Board of Educ., 106 F.R.D. 70 (E.D. Mo. 1985).
175. See, eg., People v. Edwards, 203 Cal. App. 3d 1358, 248 Cal. Rptr. 53 (1988), cert.
denied, 489 U.S. 1027 (1989); People v. Thompson, 133 Cal. App. 3d 419, 184 Cal. Rptr. 72
(1982); Jones v. Department of Human Resources, 310 S.E.2d 753 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983).
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As a general rule, communications to Catholic priests engaged in
the practice of confession come within the protections of the clergy-com-
municant privilege.176 However, a dilemma arises when the priest or
other cleric is not acting wholly within the confines of "confession," yet
the religious situation still requires confidentiality.
The Washington Supreme Court addressed this dilemma in State v.
Motherwell.1 77 In Motherwell, three religious counselors were convicted
of violating the Washington reporting statute. 178 The three counselors
claimed the clergy privilege in an evangelical Christian church. 17 9 The
court addressed the issue of whether there was an implied exemption of
clergy from the reporting requirement.18 0 In doing so, the court held
that "[s]imply establishing one's status as 'clergy' is not enough to trigger
the exemption in all circumstances. One must also be functioning in that
capacity for the exemption to apply." '181 Thus, religious counselors may
claim the privilege as long as they are acting within the scope of their
duty as clergy.18 2 On appeal, the court upheld the convictions of two of
the counselors who were not ordained ministers and did not report the
child abuse in question.8 3
Arguably any clergy member who acts within the scope of a confi-
dentiality duty, as defined by the particular denomination, whether in
spiritual counseling or consolation, should be able to claim the privilege.
However, one court did not extend this privilege to a Catholic nun be-
cause she did not perform priestly functions.1 84 In contrast, the court in
176. See Donna Krier Ioppolo et al., Civil Law and Confidentiality, in CONFIDENTIALITY
IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 150, at 3, 8.
177. 788 P.2d 1066 (Wash. 1990). See supra notes 29-40 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Motherwell.
178. Motherwell, 788 P.2d at 1067.
179. IM
180. Id. at 1069. In Motherwell, the court noted that the statute in question was amended
subsequent to the date of the offenses in the case. Id. at 1068 n.1. Thus the court's analysis
made reference to the former statute. Id.
181. Id.
182. See Wainscott v. Commonwealth, 562 S.W.2d 628 (Ky.) (requiring clergy to act in
professional capacity), cert denied, 439 U.S. 868 (1978); State v. Hereford, 518 So. 2d 515 (La.
Ct. App. 1987) (requiring clergy to act in professional capacity); Partridge v. Partridge, 199
S.W. 415 (Mo. 1909) (requiring professional capacity of clergy).
For a more complete discussion of the statutory definitions of terms such as "clerics" and
"clergy" as they relate to organizational and denominational definitions, see Mitchell, supra
note 55, at 742-46.
183. Motherwell, 788 P.2d at 1076; see also State v. Barber, 346 S.E.2d 441 (N.C. 1986)
(refused to grant privilege to Sunday school teacher who was not ordained or licensed
minister).
184. See In re Murtha, 279 A.2d 889 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1971), review denied, 281
A.2d 278 (N.J. 1971).
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Eckmann v. Board of Education 185 acquitted a Catholic nun because she
did perform certain priestly functions, such as serving as a spiritual direc-
tor. 86 Such cases, however, "entangle the state in the properly religious
matter of defining a cleric's professional role or delimiting the cleric's
ministry."'
18 7
In addition to the struggle to determine which religious roles meet
the definitional requirements of the state statutes, courts also face a prob-
lem when determining the nature of the relationship between the clergy
member and the "confider." This dilemma of which communications
qualify under the privilege was addressed in People v. Edwards.'88 In
Edwards, the court held that a communication made for the purpose of
seeking counseling rather than absolution did not merit the protection of
the privilege. 89 Other courts have applied this general rule.190 Some
have applied the privilege to communications made during marriage
counseling, 1 ' even with both spouses present.192 If both spouses partici-
pating in the communications with clergy have waived the privilege, the
clergy member must testify. 193 Courts have also extended the privilege
185. 106 F.R.D. 70 (E.D. Mo. 1985).
186. But see Masquat v. Maguire, 638 P.2d 1105 (Okla. 1981) (leaving open question
whether Catholic nun would qualify under state statute as "clergy" and therefore rightfully
claim privilege).
187. Mitchell, supra note 55, at 744.
188. 203 Cal. App. 3d 1358, 248 Cal. Rptr. 53 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1027 (1989).
189. Id. at 1363, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 56.
190. See, e.g., People v. Thompson, 133 Cal. App. 3d 419, 184 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1982) (requir-
ing purpose of receiving religious consolation); Jones v. Department of Human Resources, 310
S.E.2d 753 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) (requiring purpose of receiving spiritual counseling); Farner v.
Farner, 480 N.E.2d 251 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (allowing clergy to testify about non-religious
situation); State v. Black, 291 N.W.2d 208 (Minn. 1980) (requiring purpose of seeking spiritual
advice with expectation of confidentiality); State v. Jackson, 336 S.E.2d 437 (N.C. Ct. App.
1985) (allowing privilege as long as spiritual counsel is sought, even though cleric is relative),
review denied, 341 S.E.2d 572 (N.C. 1986).
191. See Pardie v. Pardie, 158 N.W.2d 641 (Iowa 1968) (recognizing exception for family
counseling by clergy); Kruglikov v. Kruglikov, 217 N.Y.S.2d 845 (Sup. Ct. 1961) (recognizing
exception for marital counseling by clergy), appeal dismissed, 226 N.Y.S.2d 931 (App. Div.
1962); LeGore v. LeGore,. 31 Pa. D. & C.2d 107 (1963) (recognizing exception for conversa-
tion with clergy regarding marital dispute); Rivers v. Rivers, 354 S.E.2d 784 (S.C. 1987) (rec-
ognizing exception for communications entrusted to cleric in his or her professional capacity).
But cf Ziske v. Luskin, 524 N.Y.S.2d 145 (Sup. Ct. 1987) (holding priest's records regarding
marriage counseling not privileged when couple places damages regarding their relationship at
issue at trial).
192. See Spencer v. Spencer, 301 S.E.2d 411 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983) (privilege applied to
confidential communications to clergy during marital counseling).
193. See De'Udy v. De'Udy, 495 N.Y.S.2d 616 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (privilege unavailable to
clergy if waived by communicant). Despite waiver of the privilege by the communicant, a
cleric bound by the Seal of Confession would still not be permitted to testify or report under
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to protect communications made during Catholic annulment
proceedings. 1
94
When a court rules on the nature of a communication, it must dis-
tinguish between what is privileged and what is not. Communications
made to a clergy member as a friend are not privileged. 95 However, the
communication may be classified as privileged if the requisite qualifica-
tions can be shown despite a friendship between the clergy member and
communicant. 196 Similarly, a clergy member who fortuitously overhears
a non-confessional communication would not be able to invoke the privi-
lege since no spiritual counsel was sought.'
97
Regarding the communicant, most statutes apply the clergy privi-
lege to any person, either expressly19 or impliedly.' 99 Some statutes,
however, are very specific in defining who qualifies as a communicant for
purposes of the privilege."
the Code of Canon Law. See supra notes 94-95, 151-58 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of the pertinent provisions in the Code of Canon Law.
194. See Cimijotti v. Paulsen, 219 F. Supp. 621 (N.D. Iowa 1963) (privilege applied to
confidential communications made by penitent to clergy and also to statements made by non-
penitent, to provide corroboration of penitent's statements as required by state law), aff'd, 340
F.2d 613 (8th Cir. 1965). The court reasoned that allowing elders of the church to hear other-
wise privileged communications, when made according to church discipline, "is only giving
cler[ics] the same benefit as is given to attorneys and physicians whereby they may consult
with other attorneys or physicians about a client's problem without destroying the client's
privilege." Id at 624. Were such communications to occur strictly within the confines of the
confessional, however, the cleric would not be permitted to divulge those communications,
even to other clergy. See supra notes 94-95, 151-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the pertinent provisions in the Code of Canon Law.
195. See, eg., Burger v. State, 231 S.E.2d 769 (Ga. 1977) (holding not privileged communi-
cation to cleric, who was also frequent companion, of intent to kill wife and her lover); Wain-
scott v. Commonwealth, 562 S.W.2d 628 (Ky.) (communication to cleric, as a friend, and not
acting in professional capacity was not privileged), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 868 (1978).
196. See, e.g., Jackson, 336 S.E.2d at 437 (communication to cleric who is relative may still
be privileged).
197. See, e.g., State v. Berry, 324 So. 2d 822 (La. 1975) (privilege did not apply to minister
who heard communication because defendant did not come for spiritual direction), cert. de-
nied, 425 U.S. 954 (1976).
198. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5943 (1982 & Supp. 1991) ("No cler[ic], priest,
rabbi or minister of the gospel.., who while in the course of his [or her] duties has acquired
information from any person secretly and in confidence shall be compelled, or allowed.., to
disclose that information .. " (emphasis added)).
199. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-14-5 (Burns 1986 & Supp. 1990) (clerics considered
incompetent witnesses "as to confessions or admissions made to them in course of discipline
enjoined by their respective churches").
200. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1031 (West 1966 & Supp. 1990) (defining "penitent" as
"a person who has made a penitential communication to a [cleric]"); id. § 1032 (defining "pen-
itential communication" as "a communication made in confidence, in the presence of no third
person so far as the penitent is aware, to a [cleric] who, in the course of the discipline or
practice of his [or her] church, denomination or organization, is authorized or accustomed to
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C. Purpose of the Privilege
The Supreme Court has recognized the value of the clergy-commu-
nicant privilege by stating that "[t]he priest-penitent privilege recognizes
the human need to disclose to a spiritual counselor, in total and absolute
confidence, what are believed to be flawed acts or thoughts and to receive
priestly consolation and guidance in return." ' This recognition demon-
strates the personal, as well as the social, need for confidentiality in reli-
gious conduct.
Other federal courts have subsequently noted the value of the privi-
lege. 2 The Third Circuit acknowledged that "virtually every state has
recognized some form of clergy-communicant privilege [which is]
grounded in a policy of preventing disclosures that would tend to inhibit
the development of confidential relationslips that are socially desira-
ble."20 3 Once the conditions for invoking the privilege are met,204 courts
accept that the interest in maintaining confidentiality is more important
than the court's need to be presented with all relevant evidence.205
In addition to the evidentiary purpose for the privilege, clergy-com-
municant confidentiality has both a secular and a sacred purpose.20 6 In-
voking the privilege in the case of confidentidl communications of abuse
made during religious counseling or confession would assist future pro-
hear such communications and, under the discipline or tenets of his [or her] church, denomi-
nation, or organization, has a duty to keep such communications secret.").
201. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980).
202. See, e-g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 381 (3d Cir. 1990); In re
Verplank, 329 F. Supp. 433, 435 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
203. Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d at 383.
204. Dean Wigmore spells out the conditions necessary to support a confidential communi-
cations privilege. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 2285 at 527. See supra note 13 for the criteria
for invoking such privileges.
205. See, eg., Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275, 280 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (Fahy, J., con-
curring). In Mullen, the concurring opinion elaborated on the policy reasons for upholding
the privilege:
Sound policy-reason and experience--concedes to religious liberty a rule of evi-
dence that a clergyman shall not disclose on a trial the secrets of a penitent's confi-
dential confession to him, at least absent the penitent's consent. Knowledge so
acquired in the performance of a spiritual function... is not to be transformed into
evidence to be given to the whole world.... The benefit of preserving these confi-
dences inviolate overbalances the possible benefit of permitting litigation to prosper at
the expense of... the spiritual rehabilitation of a penitent.
Id. (Fahy, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
206. See O'Brien, supra note 18, at 109. O'Brien suggests that the opportunity for the
clergy to change the pattern of abuse manifested by the abuser and the ability to "retrieve [the
abuser's] life" through reconciliation is a result of the "confidentiality of the confessional and
the sanctity of the priest-penitent privilege." This effect is what differentiates the clergy privi-
lege from other privileges and also offers a foundation for treatment. See id.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:1
tection for abused children by promoting rehabilitation of the abuser.20 7
In essence, confidentiality results in a lessening of child abuse,20 8
whereas, reporting by clergy brings about prosecution of the abuser.20 9
When the abuser is the child's parent, reporting would also impair efforts
to maintain family integrity. 210 Thus, holding the clergy-communicant
207. See generally O'Brien, supra note 18 (commenting on rehabilitative value of clergy
privilege in case of pedophilia). While counseling is appropriate and beneficial within the con-
fessional, the essence of the Sacrament of Penance is contrition on the part of the penitent and
absolution on the part of the confessor. Counseling is most appropriate as a means of deter-
mining contrition and as a vehicle for absolution.
Clergy qualifications to provide counseling vary according to the religious denomination.
For example, among strict Bible-oriented denominations, counseling is a gift of the Holy
Spirit. 1 Corinthians 12:8 (New Am. Bible) ("To one is given through the Spirit the expression
of wisdom; to another the expression of knowledge according to the same Spirit.") In contrast,
the Roman Catholic Church has established lengthy course requirements in clinical pastoral
education as prerequisites for ordination and ministerial counseling. See SYNOD OF BISHOPS,
LINEAMENTA: THE FORMATION OF PRIESTS IN CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE PRESENT DAY
(1989) ("Moral problems arising from the present-day world demand a theological explanation
which integrates the human sciences ... ."); SACRED CONGREGATION FOR CATHOLIC EDU-
CATION, THE BASIC PLAN FOR PRIESTLY FORMATION (1970) ("The study of psychology,
pedagogy, and sociology are of great assistance in the acquisition of this fuller knowledge of
people and their problems."). Methodist seminary training includes some family counseling,
and Methodist clergy must be licensed by the state in order to provide marriage and family
counseling. Telephone interview with Reverend Frederick Cook, Senior Minister, Westchester
United Methodist Church, Westchester, Cal. (Aug. 30, 1991). Similarly, the Episcopalian
clergy must meet state guidelines to be qualified as counselors. Telephone interview with Rev-
erend Lynn Jay, Vicar, St. Stephens Episcopal Church, Valencia, Cal. (Sept. 4, 1991).
Nevertheless, the essence of confession is a spiritual reconciliation with God, and the
ability of the cleric to direct a pedophile towards reconciliation with God through professional
clinical treatment is the product of both the grace of the sacrament and the counseling skills of
the confessor.
208. See O'Brien, supra note 18, at 110, 119. O'Brien points out, however, that the secular
and sacred purposes underlying the privilege are valuable in its protective effect only when
specific objectives are fostered and enforced. These include "penance, avoidance of the offense,
participation in effective treatment, [and] a sincere desire not to commit the offense again." Id.
By requiring reports from clergy, the government "undermin[es] the confidential relationship
between confiders and clergy [and] defeat[s] one valuable, nongovernmental means of achiev-
ing the state's own goal of preventing and treating child abuse." Mitchell, supra note 55, at
811.
209. The societal benefits of maintaining the clergy privilege may become especially impor-
tant as the Court reformulates an analysis to replace the compelling state interest test. For
instance, the Court may look to whether a particular religious practice serves a societal benefit
in order to determine whether it should be constitutionally protected. See infra notes 270-303
and accompanying text for a discussion of cases in which the Court has considered public
policy benefits in its analysis of other constitutional guarantees.
210. See generally Peters et al., supra note 18. The authors suggest that "[i]ntrafamilial
abuse is commonly, but wrongly, considered a less serious form of child abuse, with offenders
unlikely to abuse other children." Id. at 650. Because of this, intrafamily abuse is considered
a "family problem" and is often left to be handled by social services. Id. at 650-51. With this
or any other article concerning child abuse, the essential issue must be the best interest of the
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privilege inviolate serves both the interest of the claimant seeking rehabil-
itation and the interest of the state seeking to protect the child.211
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT BETWEEN REPORTING
STATUTES AND THE CLERGY-COMMUNICANT PRIVILEGE
A. Reporting Requirements for Clergy Fail to Accommodate the Free
Exercise Right
As a result of heightened public awareness of the widespread and
devastating effects of child abuse, the electorate has tolerated the limits
placed on testimonial privileges.212 The conflict between the secular duty
to report and the religious duty to maintain confidence should not be
posed in such a way as to suggest that clergy should always have a privi-
lege of silence.213 Free exercise of religion does not categorically pro-
hibit state action, rather, distinctions must be made on a case specific
basis.21 ' Nonetheless, the question remains whether the constitutional
right to free exercise can be protected when a specifically religious act is
confronted by mandatory reporting statutes.
Unlike Maryland v. Craig,2" 5 where the Supreme Court held that
the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was not absolute, 1 6 the
child, which is often overlooked in favor of the rights or presumptions surrounding a parent in
the context of family.
211. See O'Brien, supra note 18, at 117-28. This argument rests on the assumption that the
privilege is, in fact, conducive to treatment and a cessation of abuse on the part of the confes-
sor. O'Brien offers a descriptive analysis of how the privilege allows the clergy to meet these
needs by recommending treatment. He discusses four modes of treatment for the pedophile:
(1) psychotherapy, (2) behavior therapy, (3) surgery, and (4) medication. Id.
Society's interest is also served insofar as "treatment undertaken on the individual's own
voluntary initiative is easier and better than treatment forced later on as a result of some social
crisis." Id at 119 (quoting D.J. West, Adult Sexual Interest in Children: Implications for
Social Control, in SEXUAL INTEREsT IN CHILDREN, PERSONALITY AND PSYCHOPATHY 252,
263 (1981)); see also id at 110 n.78.
212. See Ioppolo et al., supra note 176, at 35. In some instances, however, legislatures have
reconsidered the abrogation of the clergy-communicant privilege. For example, the Florida
legislature reinstituted the privilege after John Mellish, a minister who refused to divulge infor-
mation he obtained in the confession of a parishioner accused of molesting a young girl, was
held in contempt of court and sentenced to 60 days in jail. See Mellish v. Florida, No. 84-1930
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. dismissed Aug. 30, 1985).
213. See William A. Cole, Religious Confidentiality and the Reporting of Child Abuse: A
Statutory and ConstitutionalAnalysis, 21 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 24-35 (1987). But cf
O'Brien, supra note 18, at 96 (suggesting that "reducing this painful and complicated predica-
ment to such a simplistic conflict is superficial").
214. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 388 (3d Cir. 1990) (no hard and fast
rules as to when free exercise exemptions are required).
215. 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990).
216. Id. at 3166.
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protection afforded by the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause can-
not be otherwise assured or satisfied.117 The state's interest in the protec-
tion of children from future abuse cannot be justified without reliable
assurances that the constitutional protection of religious practice is
guaranteed.
In Craig, the majority held that certain constitutional rights218 may
be dispensed with when "necessary to further an important public pol-
icy. ' 2 19 The defendant challenged the use of a state statutory procedure
that allowed a judge to receive the testimony of an alleged child abuse
victim by one-way closed circuit television. 22 ° The constitutional guar-
antee of a defendant's right to confront his or her accusers was ensured
by the opportunity for cross-examination, and the ability of the judge,
jury and defendant to view the witnesses' demeanor by video monitor.221
The Craig majority opinion provides for an alternative means to sat-
isfy the Confrontation Clause's physical presence requirement.222 The
Court makes these accommodations narrowly because of existing public
policy and the necessity of the case.2 23 The Court determined that the
"[s]tate's interest in the physical and psychological well-being of child
abuse victims" is an important public policy, and therefore, may "out-
weigh.., a defendant's right to face his or her accusers in court. ' 224 The
majority ruled that the Maryland closed-circuit testimony statute accom-
modated the truth-seeking protections promoted by the Confrontation
Clause.225
217. Idr For example, a priest cannot keep silent as to most of a parishioner's confession
and maintain the Seal of Confession inviolate. See supra notes 94-95, 151-58 and accompany-
ing text for pertinent provisions in the Code of Canon Law.
218. Craig involved the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3166.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 3160-61. This procedure could be invoked only if the trial court determined that
the child's courtroom testimony would cause serious emotional distress such that the child
would not be able to communicate. Id. at 3161; see also MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.
§ 9-102 (1989 & Supp. 1991).
221. See Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3161.
222. Id at 3169.
223. Id. "The critical inquiry... is whether use of... [alternative protections to face-to-
face confrontation] is necessary to further an important state interest." Id. at 3167. Justice
O'Connor wrote for the majority that such alternatives are necessary to further state public
policy, id., whereas Justice Scalia wrote in dissent to say that such accommodation is not
permitted under the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 3171-72 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia
wrote: "I am persuaded... that the Maryland procedure is virtually constitutional. Since it is
not, however, actually constitutional," any accommodation must fail. Id. at 3176 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
224. Id at 3167.
225. Id. at 3166-67. The Court reasoned that the "central concern of the confrontation
clause is to ensure reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to
[Vol. 25:1
CLERGY AND REPORTING STATUTES
In his dissent, Justice Scalia condemned this type of "interest bal-
ancing," '226 and rejected any accommodation that eliminated the face-to-
face confrontation right protected by the Sixth Amendment. He wrote:
[T]he Confrontation Clause does not guarantee reliable evi-
dence; it guarantees specific trial procedures that were thought
to assure reliable evidence, undeniably among which was "face-
to-face" confrontation.... [T]hat the defendant should be con-
fronted by the witnesses who appear at trial is not a preference
"reflected" by the Confrontation Clause; it is a constitutional
right unqualifiedly guaranteed.227
This same reasoning should be applied to the Free Exercise Clause.
The First Amendment guarantees regarding religion deserve the same
protection that Scalia called for in his dissent in Craig to maintain the
Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. Just as the "unwillingness [of
a witness to testify in the presence of a criminal defendant] cannot be a
valid excuse under the Confrontation Clause, whose very object is to
place the witness under the sometimes hostile glare of the defendant,"22
the state's desire to halt child abuse cannot justify limitations on the Free
Exercise Clause. The First Amendment Free Exercise Clause protects
historical and well-documented religious acts, such as the Sacrament of
Penance, even when the state seeks to use that act to protect its
citizens.229
Furthermore, the absence of comparable alternative safeguards for
the specific religious act protected by the Seal of Confession prevents the
state from ensuring the free exercise guarantee while enforcing a report-
ing statute as applied to confidential religious communications made to
rigorous testing" in the adversarial process. Id. at 3163. It stated that the purpose of the Sixth
Amendment right to confrontation is served by the combined effect of several elements,
namely physical presence, oath, cross-examination and observation of the witness' demeanor
by the trier of fact. Id. The Court found that Maryland's statutory procedure preserved all
elements of the confrontation right, with only the exception that the child witness could not
see the defendant as the child testified. Id. at 3166. Thus, the Court held that the use of
televised testimony did not impinge on the purpose of the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 3167.
226. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3176 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia, with whom Justices
Brennan, Marshall and Stevens joined in dissent, wrote: "The purpose of enshrining [the Sixth
Amendment's right to confrontation in criminal prosecution] ... in the Constitution was to
assure that none of the many policy interests from time to time pursued by statutory law could
overcome a defendant's right to face his or her accusers in court." Id. at 3171 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
227. Id. at 3172-73 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
228. Id. at 3174 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
229. "[The state's interest in more convictions of guilty defendants] is not an unworthy
interest, but it should not be dressed up as a humanitarian one." Id. at 3175 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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clergy. In reference to child abuse reporting statutes, the state cannot
provide for the same degree of accommodation as it did in Craig.230
In addition, the public policy of protecting children supports an ex-
emption for confidential religious communications under mandatory
child abuse reporting statutes following a theory that the religious prac-
tice and the reporting statutes serve this same end.23" 1 Nevertheless, after
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith,232 there
can be no such accommodation because there is no longer case authority
mandating a balancing of the intricacies of the religious practices.233
Mandatory clergy reporting of communications made within a specific
religious act that requires secrecy as an essential element voids the pro-
tection of the Free Exercise Clause without providing any more protec-
tion for the child.
B. Clergy Exemptions from Child Abuse Reporting Statutes
and State Liability
One possible argument for the state maintaining a reporting require-
ment for privileged communications to clerics 234 is based on an expan-
sion of the argument derived from the holding in DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Department of Social Services.235 In DeShaney, the United States
Supreme Court held that a Fourteenth Amendment right to liberty236 is
230. For instance, in Craig, the trial court had made individualized findings that each of the
child witnesses needed special protection. See id. at 3163. Furthermore, the Supreme Court
stated "[t]he Confrontation Clause, [unlike the Free Exercise Clause], is generally satisfied
when the defense is given a full and fair opportunity to probe and expose . . . testimonial
infirmities such as forgetfulness, confusion, or evasion through cross examination, thereby call-
ing.., attention... [to] giving scant weight to the witnesses' testimony." Id. at 3164 (quoting
Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 22 (1985) (per curiam)). In addition, Craig's acknowl-
edgement that the "admission of certain hearsay statements against a defendant despite the
defendant's inability to confront the declarant at trial," id., has no counterpart in the First
Amendment's protections. There are other instances when Sixth Amendment rights must be
interpreted in the context of the necessity of trial and the adversary process. See id. at 3166,
3169.
231. See supra notes 110-17, 206-09 and accompanying text for elaboration on this theory.
232. 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
233. Id. at 1604. Justice Scalia refused to allow the courts to examine religious beliefs in
order to determine the plausibility of a religious claim under the Free Exercise Clause. "[I]t is
horrible to contemplate that federal judges will regularly balance against the importance of
general laws the significance of religious practice." Id. at 1606 n.5 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
234. See generally Lori DeMond, DeShaney's Effect on Future "Poor Joshuas"- Whether a
State Should be Liable Under the Fourteenth Amendment for Harm Inflicted by a Private Indi-
vidual, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REv. 685 (reliance by children on state statute for protection from
physical abuse creates substantive entitlement that should not be "arbitrarily undermined").
235. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
236. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, which states in part: "No state shall.., deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Id.
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not denied when the state fails to protect an individual from harm in-
flicted by a private citizen.237 In order to successfully claim a Fourteenth
Amendment violation, the claimant must first show that the state de-
prived him or her of a constitutional right.238 If the state deprives the
claimant of a constitutional right by its failure to provide protection, then
the state is burdened with an affirmative duty to provide protection.
239
A constitutional deprivation will only occur, however, when one of
two criteria is met: (1) "The plaintiff [must be] denied the benefits of a
particular state statute which entitles the plaintiff to a property or liberty
interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment; or (2) The state ac-
tively intervene[s] to some extent, and ... withdr[aws] its aid."2'4  In
DeShaney, the Court failed to address the second criterion and left the
statutory entitlement issue unresolved.24 1 However, the dissent's reason-
ing242 coupled with the premise held by Professor DeMond, who com-
ments on the DeShaney case,243 may support the argument that the state
should be held liable for the deprivation of Fourteenth Amendment
rights to liberty by allowing an exception for clergy from mandated re-
porting of child abuse. 244 The assertion would be that the child's entitle-
237. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195. A similar case was recently decided involving the Illinois
Department of Children and Family Services' failure to make "reasonable efforts" to prevent
or eliminate the need for removal of abused, neglected or dependent children from their homes
or to make it possible for the children to return to their homes. Artist M. v. Johnson, 917 F.2d
980, 983 (7th Cir. 1990). In Artist M., the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court finding
that such a failure was a violation of the 1980 Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act
(AAA), which encourages greater efforts to find permanent homes for children by providing
reimbursements to the states for foster care maintenance and adoption assistance payments.
Id. at 989, 992; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-628, 670-679(a) (1988).
238. See DeMond, supra note 234, at 699-700.
239. Id. at 700. See generally Caitlin E. Borgmann, Battered Women's Substantive Due
Process Claims: Can Orders of Protection Deflect DeShaney?, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1280 (1990)
(arguing DeShaney inapplicable to battered women); Steven F. Huefner, Affirmative Duties in
the Public Schools After DeShaney, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1940 (1990) (arguing that public
school systems are "custodial" and calling for extension of affirmative duties of DeShaney to
public school systems); Laura Oren, DeShaney's Unfinished Business: The Foster Child's Due
Process Right to Safety, 69 N.C. L. RaV. 113 (1990) (arguing for extension of DeShaney to
foster care system).
240. DeMond, supra note 234, at 700.
241. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195 & n.2.
242. Id. at 205 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
243. The Supreme Court in DeShaney declined to consider the statutory entitlement issue
because the question had been raised for the first time in petitioner's brief to that court. A
future case making this argument in a timely manner may succeed. DeMond, supra note 234,
at 700-01 & n.89.
244. See, eg., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:403(B)(4)(b) (West 1986 & Supp. 1990).
[W]hen a priest, rabbi, duly ordained minister, or Christian Science practitioner has
acquired knowledge of abuse or neglect from a person during a confession or other
sacred communication, he [or she] shall encourage that person to report but shall not
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ment to state protection would be created by the state statute that
requires reporting. If the state made a statutory allowance for the clergy
to claim a privilege exception, the state would fail to protect the child
from abuse, thereby depriving the child of a constitutional liberty interest
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.245 By enacting the statute,
the state assumes an affirmative duty to protect the child by requiring
reports of child abuse; if the clergy are exempt from such a reporting
requirement, the state could be held liable.246
The response to this argument is the same as in the First Amend-
ment analysis below:247 because the privilege from mandatory reporting
for clergy is conducive to protecting the child's interest,248 the state
would not make an affirmative denial-only an affirmative support-of
any protected right by exempting clergy from a statutory duty to report.
The privilege should therefore be respected on both grounds-first, as a
means of protecting the best interest of the child, and second, as sus-
taining the First Amendment's guarantee of free exercise to religious ob-
servers in an objective religious context.
V. THE FREE EXERCISE GUARANTEE: A DELICATE
BALANCE OF INTERESTS
A. A False Conflict
One commentator has made a First Amendment argument that the
Free Exercise Clause requires an exemption for clerics from child abuse
reporting statutes.249 The Fourteenth Amendment applies the Free Ex-
be a mandated reporter of that information given in the confession or sacred
communication.
Id.
245. The plaintiff in DeShaney argued that every child in Wisconsin had a substantive due
process right, guaranteed by the Constitution, to be free from physical abuse, whether it was
defined as a "liberty interest" in such freedom or a "property interest" in the guarantee of
safety. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195; see DeMond, supra note 234, at 701; see also Taylor v.
Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 794 (11th Cir. 1987) (advancing similar argument), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1065 (1989).
246. The state involvement is self-evident and satisfies that requirement. See DeMond,
supra note 234, at 701-02 (required "special relationship" that may be established outside
confines of strict custodial status).
247. See infra notes 249-67 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 110-17, 206-09 and accompanying text; see also O'Brien, supra note
18, at 128.
249. See generally Kathryn Keegan, Comment, The Clergy-Penitent Privilege and the Child
Abuse Reporting Statute: Is the Secret Sacred?, 19 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 1031 (1986) (sup-
porting contention that mandating clergy reporting of child abuse violates tradition of free
exercise).
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ercise Clause to state governments.2 50 In order to make a free exercise
claim, one must show an infringement of his or her free exercise right.25'
Before the Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division, Depart-
ment of Human Resources v. Smith,252 once that showing was made the
state had the burden of justifying the infringement by establishing that
the law furthered a compelling interest.253 Because the burden shifted to
the state, the clergy did not have to show that the clergy-communicant
privilege did, in fact, serve the state's interest.2 54 After Smith, however,
a religious claim must rest on its naked significance because the compel-
ling state interest test is no longer available.
In State v. Motherwell,5 5 the Washington Supreme Court held that
the state's interest in protecting the welfare of children was sufficient to
justify an infringement of the claimant's right to free exercise.2 56 In mak-
ing this determination, the court applied the analysis it used in Witters v.
Commission for the Blind, 5 7 which held that the free exercise claimant
must show "the coercive effect of the enactment as it operates against
him in the practice of his religion. ' 2 8 In other words, the claimant must
show that the action imposed by the state forces the claimant to act
against the tenets of his or her religion. 59 In Motherwell, two of the
250. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
251. One commentator argues that although the clergy privilege may find support under a
free exercise analysis, it presents complications under the Establishment Clause. To reconcile
this conflict, the author suggests that the court, being in the best position to do so, should
balance the danger of violating the Establishment Clause if the privilege is allowed against the
danger of violating free exercise rights if the privilege is refused. See generally Jane E. Mayes,
Striking Down the Clergyman-Communicant Privilege Statutes: Let Free Exercise of Religion
Govern, 62 IND. L.J. 397 (1987) (arguing for integrity of privilege under particular circum-
stances). Such an analysis would only uphold the clergy-penitent privilege, since in balancing
the interests not allowing testimony in certain situations would serve the interests of the state.
252. 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
253. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981).
254. See O'Brien, supra note 18, at 137.
255. 788 P.2d 1066 (Wash. 1990). For a brief factual description of the Motherwell case,
see supra notes 29-40 and accompanying text.
256. Motherwell, 788 P.2d at 1072.
257. 771 P.2d 1119, 1123 (Wash.) (Witters II), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 147 (1989).
258. Id. (quoting School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963)).
259. Witters v. Commission for the Blind, 689 P.2d 53, 57 (Wash. 1984) (Witters I), rev'd
on other grounds, sub nom. Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs., 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (The
challenged state action must somehow compel or pressure the individual to violate a tenet of
his religious belief."). In the case of mandatory child abuse reporting laws, the statute would
have the coercive effect of requiring any cleric, who would otherwise not be required to report
a suspected case of child abuse, to violate the tenet of his or her religion that mandates confi-
dentiality. The importance of this tenet is underscored in the Code of Canon Law. See supra
notes 94-95, 151-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of the pertinent provisions in the
Code of Canon Law.
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claimants were religious counselors who contended that the reporting
statute impaired their ability to counsel their parishioners. 2 ° The court,
however, held that free exercise claimants must show not only that their
religious practice is inhibited, but that adherence to the state's require-
ment makes it impossible for them to observe their religious tenets.261
The court distinguished the claimants in Motherwell based on their
role as counselors. 262 The court noted, however, that requiring reporting
in situations where the religious tenets mandate that all information in
the counseling session be confidential may lead to a different result.
263
Clearly, the court implied a reference to the express code provisions for
confessional secrecy or the severe ecclesiastical penalties such as those of
the Roman Catholic Church.264 Because the Code of Canon Law re-
quires that communications within the Seal of Confession remain confi-
dential, it appears to place the Catholic priest in opposition to the best
interest of the child.
Notwithstanding the apparent conflict between the child's safety
right and the clergy's free exercise claim, in certain situations it is in the
best interest of the child, and therefore consistent with the state's inter-
est, that knowledge of the particular incident of abuse or at least the
particular abuser not be reported by clergy. Thus, even where reporting
would not infringe on First Amendment rights, as the court held in
Motherwell,265 the state's interest in the welfare of the child may well be
advanced by maintaining clergy-communicant confidentiality. In es-
sence, the issue of serving the child's best interest, insofar as it relates to
the reporting of child abuse by clergy, may not be rooted in the Free
Exercise Clause conflict.266 Entangling the child's interest with the
260. Motherwell, 788 P.2d at 1070-71.
261. Id. (citing Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 451
(1988) (holding no coercion to violate religious beliefs simply by virtue of fact that state's act
will impair, or even "virtually destroy," ability to practice one's religion)).
262. Id. at 1071 ("Requiring church counselors to report suspected child abuse does not
prevent them from counseling their parishioners. Counseling can continue even after a report
is made.").
263. Id at 1071 n.8.
264. See supra notes 94-95, 151-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of the pertinent
provisions in the Code of Canon Law.
265. 788 P.2d at 1072-73.
266. This assertion is consistent with Professor O'Brien's reasoning:
Only when these objectives-penance, avoidance of the offense, participation in effec-
tive treatment, a sincere desire not to commit the offense again-are fostered and
enforced, is there an effective answer to those who would abolish the privilege in light
of the vast increase in child abuse. An emphasis upon these objectives, rather than
upon the constitutional basis in free exercise, is a better approach to the state's actual
or potential abrogation of the priest-penitent privilege; it responds to the public inter-
est in lessening child abuse.
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rights of religious practitioners seems illogical and inhibitive of the states'
goals when, in defined situations, the interests of the two are
concomitant.267
C. The Child's Best Interest Versus Freedom of Religion
In State v. Motherwell,26 the court cited a number of cases in other
contexts in which the United States Supreme Court and the Washington
Supreme Court have upheld state regulations that advance the state's in-
terest in protecting children.26 9 However, these cases are distinguishable
because the claimants' interests were arguably diametrically opposed to
the interests of the state and the welfare of the child. But these interests
do not always conflict in situations requiring clergy to report child abuse.
Thus, the application of a free exercise analysis is not always necessary,
or appropriate, when maintaining confidentiality not only conforms to
religious tenets, but also serves the secular purposes of preventing future
abuse and healing the family so that the abused child can have the benefit
of a normal family environment. Such cases occur when maintaining
confidentiality serves to foster rehabilitation for the abuser and thereby
serves the best interest of the child.
A case in point is Maryland v. Craig.270 Craig, like Motherwell,
weighed a governmental interest against a constitutional right. In Craig,
the United States Supreme Court weighed the interest in protecting chil-
dren from abuse against the Sixth Amendment guarantee of the right to
confront one's accuser.271 The Court held that a state's interest in the
well-being of child abuse victims27 2 may be sufficiently important, in
O'Brien, supra note 18, at 110 (emphasis added).
267. This point becomes more obvious when considering the state's justification for infring-
ing on the religious practice of confidentiality. In Backlund v. Board of Commissioners, the
court held that a state regulation that infringed on religious practices would be justified by a
"compelling governmental interest." 724 P.2d 981, 986 (Wash. 1986), appeal dismissed, 481
U.S. 1034 (1987). The state's interest in cases of confidentiality is obviously the protection of
children, which is unquestionably compelling. To satisfy that interest, the state regulations
must be "the least restrictive imposition on tha practice of [the claimant's] belief." Id.
268. 788 P.2d 1066 (Wash. 1990).
269. See id. at 1072 (citing Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 390 U.S. 598 (1968)
(involving parent's free exercise rights concerning blood transfusions for child), aff'g 278 F.
Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (involving child
labor laws); State v. Meacham, 612 P.2d 795 (Wash. 1980) (involving proof of paternity)).
270. 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990).
271. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him [or her].").
272. The majority opinion in Craig cites a line of cases holding that "a state's interest in
'the protection of minor victims of sex crimes from further trauma and embarrassment' is a
'compelling' one." Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3167 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,
475 U.S. 596, 607 (1982)).
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some cases, to outweigh a defendant's right to face his or her accusers in
court.2 7 3
In the majority opinion, Justice O'Connor stated that general rules
of law which grant protections such as those offered by the Sixth Amend-
ment, "however beneficent in their operation and valuable to the ac-
cused, must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and
the necessities of the case."' 274 The constitutionally protected interest in
confrontation may in fact "disserve" the Confrontation Clause's truth-
seeking goal by causing significant emotional distress in the child and
inhibiting the child's testimony.275 Thus, the protected constitutional in-
terest is outweighed when the state's interest can be more effectively at-
tained by denying the protected interest. 6
The Craig decision shows that the denial of one interest can actually
serve another interest. This accommodation is possible under mandatory
reporting statutes as well. Because required clergy reporting may actu-
ally disserve the state's interest in protecting children, and because the
state's interest may be served more effectively by not requiring clergy to
report under certain circumstances, 277 the First Amendment right to free
exercise is not outweighed by any other interest and should therefore be
protected. Such an analysis presents one possible response to the pend-
ing gauntlet to free exercise.
Specifically, within the context of the Seal of Confession, any effort
on the part of the state to prosecute or provide civil penalties would vio-
late the express wording of the Free Exercise Clause.278 This argument,
incorporating the historical significance of the First Amendment, Justice
Scalia's fierce repudiation of Justice O'Connor's "virtual" approach to
the Sixth Amendment in Craig,2 79 and Employment Division, Department
273. In Craig, Sandra Ann Craig was charged with various sexual offenses committed
against Brooke Etze, a six-year-old child who attended a pre-kindergarten school owned by
Craig. See id. at 3160. The issue was whether use of a one-way closed circuit television cam-
era during the child's testimony in lieu of testimony in open court was necessary to further an
important state interest-in this case, the psychological well-being of the child. Id. at 3169.
274. Id. at 3165 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895) (Confrontation
Clause intended to prevent conviction by affidavit)).
275. Id. at 3169. The Court's rationale in Craig is that the Sixth Amendment's Confronta-
tion Clause was designed to foster truth rather than hearsay. Thus, the primary goal is truth,
not physical confrontation. Id. The Court stated that "face-to-face confrontation 'may so
overwhelm the child as to prevent the possibility of effective testimony.'" Id. (quoting Coy v.
Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1032 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
276. Id. The Court stated that the state's interest will outweigh the constitutional interest
only after the state shows why it is necessary to do so in a particular case.
277. See supra notes 110-17, 206-11 and accompanying text.
278. See Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3176 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
279. Id. at 3171-76 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see supra notes 226-29 and accompanying text.
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of Human Resources v. Smith's28 abandonment of the compelling state
interest test,28 1 requires the state to recognize historical religious practice
and to substantiate statutory effectiveness.282
In the same way that the Court in Craig balanced the interests of the
child against the Sixth Amendment, the Court balanced the child's inter-
est against the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
283
in Baltimore City Department of Social Services v. Bouknight. 284 In
Bouknight, the Court held that a mother could not invoke the privilege
against self-incrimination to resist a juvenile court order to produce a
child suspected of being abused.285 The child, Maurice M., was sus-
pected of being abused by his mother.286 A juvenile court order was ob-
tained to remove Maurice from Bouknight's control.287  Bouknight
violated the order and was held in contempt.288 Bouknight claimed that
the order unconstitutionally compelled her to testify, through the pro-
duction of the child in court, that she had continuing control over the
boy under circumstances of abuse; circumstances for which she reason-
ably suspected she would be prosecuted. 289  The Court rejected this
claim, reasoning that the interest in protecting the child falls within a
"regulatory regime constructed to effectuate the state's public purposes
unrelated to the enforcement of its criminal laws."2 90
Similarly, requiring clergy to report would fall under "a regulatory
regime constructed to effectuate the state's public purpose" in protecting
children, and therefore should be enforced. Although the reporting stat-
utes may be related to the enforcement of criminal laws against child
abuse,291 Bouknight suggests that even when criminal conduct may exist,
280. 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
281. Id. at 1602-06.
282. There is reasonable doubt that any statute directing clergy to report will bring about
fewer instances of child abuse. See supra note 117 for a discussion of the Maryland law man-
dating reports of child abuse from psychotherapists.
283. See U.S. CONST. amend. V, which states in part: "No person... shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself [or herself]."
284. 110 S. Ct. 900 (1990).
285. Id. at 903.
286. See id.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 904.
289. Id. at 905.
290. Id. This characterization was brought about by Bouknight's assumption of custodial
duties. Id. at 905-07. "The state imposes and enforces that obligation as part of a broadly
directed, non-criminal regulatory regime governing children cared for pursuant to custodial
orders." Id. at 907. Similarly, the classes of persons required to report under the various
reporting requirements are required to do so because of the "custodial" nature of their rela-
tionship with the child. See supra notes 123-27 and accompanying text.
291. See Bouknight, 110 S. Ct. at 912-13 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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a court may enforce its request "for reasons related entirely to the child's
well-being." '292 Given the weighted interest in the child's well-being, a
balance of interests should shift in favor of clergy not reporting in certain
situations.293 Since mandated reporting may even run counter to the
state's public purpose,294 the First Amendment interest in protecting
confidentiality within religious practices should be protected when it is
consistent with the state's interest.295
Finally, in Osborne v. Ohio,2 96 the United States Supreme Court up-
held a state statute that proscribed the possession and viewing of child
pornography by putting the state's interest in protecting children above
the "First Amendment interest in viewing and possessing child pornogra-
phy" in the privacy of the home.29 7 The Court found that the state's
justification for the law-the protection of children-was unique and
compelling, unlike other reasons submitted for state restrictions, 298 and
therefore was sufficient to outweigh the First Amendment privacy inter-
292. Id. at 908.
293. See supra notes 110-17, 206-11 and accompanying text. Throughout this argument, it
is important to keep in mind that clergy silence is only justified under a free exercise claim
when that silence is mandated by an objective religious practice. The mere fact of being a
cleric does not automatically exempt a person from reporting in all circumstances.
294. Id.
295. After Smith, this results from the naked claim of the free exercise of religion, which is
different from balancing interests under a compelling interest test. See supra notes 72-85 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the holding in Smith.
296. 110 S. Ct. 1691 (1990).
297. Id. at 1695-97. In Osborne, the petitioner possessed four photographs in his home,
depicting nude male adolescents in sexually explicit positions. Id. at 1695. The Court noted
that child pornography has minimal First Amendment value, but still assumed the existence of
a First Amendment interest in the private viewing and possessing of child pornography. Id.
The Ohio statute prohibited any person from possessing or viewing any material or perform-
ance showing a minor who is not his child or ward in a state of nudity, unless (a) the material
or performance is presented for a bona fide purpose by or to a person having a proper interest
therein, or (b) the possessor knows that the minor's parents or guardian has consented in
writing to such photographing or use of the minor. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.323(A)(3)
(Anderson Supp. 1990).
298. See, eg., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (Wisconsin statute providing that
residents who have not met court-ordered obligations for child support may not marry without
court approval held to violate equal protection); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)
(Massachusetts statute making it a felony for anyone except those provided by statute to give
away contraceptive devices found unconstitutional on equal protection grounds); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (Connecticut statute forbidding use of contraceptives held
unconstitutional because it violated marital privacy); see also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557
(1969) (striking down Georgia statute outlawing private possession of obscene material be-
cause it violated First Amendment right to receive information and ideas).
In Osborne, the Court held that "the interests underlying child pornography prohibitions
far exceed the interests justifying the Georgia law at issue in Stanley." Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at
1695.
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est.299 The anti-pornography statute was construed to be narrow in
scope3" and justified in light of the state's interest in protecting children
and the nature of the activity being regulated."0'
In contrast, a child abuse reporting statute that abrogates confidenti-
ality within an objective religious act is not on equal footing with an anti-
pornography statute even though both may seek to protect children. The
state will have a more difficult time establishing the effectiveness of a
statute limiting confidentiality within a confessional than establishing the
effectiveness of the anti-pornography statute. Nothing in pornography
will serve the child's best interest, but a strong argument can be made
that such an interest is served by clergy confidentiality.3"2
Given the Supreme Court's analyses in Craig, Bouknight and Os-
borne-that the child's best interest may invite the Court to weigh con-
stitutional guarantees-and given the significance of confidentiality as a
preventative and rehabilitative means to limit child abuse, the clergy
privilege should be considered part of the arsenal to protect the child's
best interest. This argument is important because it invites the state to
consider the statutory protection of the privilege30 3 and avoid constitu-
tional litigation. The argument is also important because it suggests that
statutory elimination of clergy confidentiality within specific situations is
not the only way to provide for the best interest of a child. The child's
best interest may actually be furthered by maintaining the privilege.
Thus, there is a false conflict between the state's goal and the religious
practice because both can work toward the same end.
In terms of the state's interest being advanced by the least restrictive
means, as required by Backlund v. Board of Commissioners,3° the
Motherwell court implied that by requiring only reporting and not com-
missive preventative action, the state accomplishes its goal by the least
299. Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1695-97.
300. Id. at 1698-99.
301. Id. at 1695-97.
302. See supra notes 206-11 and accompanying text.
303. See Peyote Use In Idaho Approved, WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 1991, at A5, reporting that
23 states have passed legislation legalizing the religious use of peyote by members of the Native
American Church. Id. In June 1991 the Oregon legislature enacted a bill that legalized peyote
use by members of the Native American Church in the practice of their religion. Act approved
June 24, 1991, cl. 329 (WL, OR-LEGIS) (amending OR. REv. STAT. § 475.922 (1989)). Re-
cently the Idaho legislature enacted a law allowing Native Americans to legally transport pe-
yote to reservations for religious ceremonies and health purposes. IDAHO CODE § 37-2732A
(Supp. 1991); see also Indians May Transport Peyote, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 31, 1991, It A12.
304. 724 P.2d 981, 986 (Wash. 1986). See supra note 267 for a discussion of the Backlund
case.
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intrusive means."' The inverse is actually true: the state accomplishes
its goal by the least intrusive means by allowing commissive preventative
action and not requiring reporting. In other words, the state can be non-
intrusive by allowing clergy to participate in quelling the confessor's abu-
sive habits through spiritual counseling without threatening the cleric
with criminal prosecution. This does not suggest that allowing confiden-
tial spiritual counseling to take place would obviate criminal conse-
quences for the alleged abuser. Presumably, any person acting in the role
of confessor truly interested in seeing the child protected and the abuser
treated would counsel the abuser properly, so as to initiate autonomous
ceding to authority.3 06
D. A Changing Constitutional Standard
The standard used in Maryland v. Craig3 o7 delicately balances the
compelling interest of the state in protecting children against the consti-
tutional right of the defendant to face his or her accusers in court.30 8
This standard changes, however, when the government action involved-
in this case, mandating clergy to report-substantially burdens a reli-
gious practice. In Employment Division, Department of Human Re-
sources v. Smith,3 09 the United States Supreme Court held that "Oregon
[could], consistent with the Free Exercise Clause, deny respondents un-
employment compensation when their dismissal results from use of [sac-
ramental peyote]."3 ' 0 Referring to the prohibition against peyote use,
the Court stated that it would be a violation of the Free Exercise Clause
if the state sought to ban the performance of or abstention from religious
acts solely.31 If the law is not specifically directed at religious practice,
and it is constitutional when applied to those who commit the act for
305. See Motherwell, 788 P.2d at 1073. But cf Cole, supra note 213, at 46-50 (broad re-
quirements of many child protection statutes excessively burden free exercise of religion and
fail "least restrictive means" test when applied to clergy).
306. For example, within the specific confines of the confessional, the confessor could refuse
absolution of past offenses unless the abuser participated in professional and supervised coun-
seling. Within the Roman Catholic Church, absolution can be so conditioned. See CODE OF
CANON LAW, supra note 53, at 689-90.
307. 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990).
308. See id. at 3166-67.
309. 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990). In Smith, two men were fired from their jobs at a private drug
rehabilitation program because of their use of peyote, which is a hallucinogenic drug, in a
sacramental ceremony of their Native American Church. Id. at 1597. Subsequently, their
unemployment benefits were denied by the state of Oregon pursuant to a state statute which
disqualified employees who were released from their jobs due to "misconduct." Id. at 1598.
The two men claimed that such a denial violated their right to free exercise of religion. Id.
310. Id. at 1606.
311. Id. at 1599.
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nonreligious reasons, then the Free Exercise Clause does not relieve an
individual of the obligation to comply with the law.312 The Court takes
this position even where the law happens to forbid or require the per-
formance of an act that a religious belief requires or forbids.31 3
The Smith Court held that governmental actions "that substantially
burden a religious practice" cannot be evaluated using the "compelling
government interest" test.314 The Court would not apply the compelling
state interest test even when the conduct prohibited is "central" to the
individual's religion.315 The Court then described the variety of cases
that would arise if a compelling state interest analysis were used for con-
stitutionally required religious exemptions from civic obligations.31 6
These cases are distinguishable from the case of exempting clergy from
child abuse reporting statutes because the governmental interest in pro-
tecting children and the religious interest in confidentiality are likely to
be proponents of the same end. 317 The Supreme Court relied on this
societal benefit argument in Craig.318 If the state legislatures accept the
notion that not reporting confidential religious communications would
actually further the state's interest in protecting children from further
abuse, it would not be necessary to balance the confidentiality and child
protection interests in the free exercise arena.
Once this argument has been accepted, the issue changes. The focus
shifts from free exercise protections to legislative drafting, and the ques-
tion becomes: where should state legislatures draw the line in reporting
312. See id. at 1599-1600.
313. See id.
314. See id. at 1604. The Court noted:
The "compelling government interest" requirement seems benign, because it is famil-
iar from other fields. But using it as the standard that must be met before the govern-
ment may accord different treatment... is not remotely comparable to using it for
the purpose asserted here. What it produces in those other fields ... are constitu-
tional norms; what it would produce here-a private right to ignore generally appli-
cable laws-is a constitutional anomaly.
Id. The Court pointed out that in this context no governmental action has ever been invali-
dated using the compelling interest test except for unemployment compensation. Id. at 1602.
However, even if that test were applied beyond that narrow field, it could not be applied to
exemptions from a generally applicable criminal law. See id. at 1603. "The government's
ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful conduct, like its ability
to carry out other aspects of public policy, 'cannot depend on measuring the effects of a gov-
ernmental action on a religious objector's spiritual development.'" Id. (quoting Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988)).
315. See id. at 1604.
316. Id. at 1605-06. Justice O'Connor referred to this part of the majority opinion as "the
parade of horribles." Id. at 1612-13 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
317. See supra notes 110-17, 206-11 and accompanying text for a discussion of how confi-
dentiality rules and child abuse reporting statutes accomplish the same goal.
318. See supra notes 215-30 and accompanying text.
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statutes to best promote the state's interest in protecting children by al-
lowing clergy members not to report? Regardless of the standard ap-
plied, courts are denying free exercise claims when the argument in
support of confidentiality does not demand a constitutional analysis.319
Restrictions on the right to claim the clergy-communicant privilege to
protect the confidentiality of confessions and religious counseling should
not even enter the free exercise domain.
E. A Workable Solution
The states' interests, whether or not described as compelling in rela-
tion to the clergy, religious or private interests, point toward one goal:
the protection of children.320 In pursuit of this goal, states can and
should implement requirements for reporting suspected cases of child
abuse by those in positions most likely to know about them. Those who
do not have a bona fide reason for withholding such information should
be required to comply. States should thus mandate reporting from every-
one, exempting those who by not reporting would advance the state's
interest in protecting children.32'
In order to fully advance its objective of protecting children, the
state should consider whether the objective of protecting children would
be further advanced by exempting any classes of persons from the re-
quirement of reporting.322 Specifically, the state should exempt clergy
from the reporting requirement when the information is received within
the confines of the Seal of Confession because of its historical and objec-
tive character. In addition, those who qualify as clergy for purposes of
claiming the privilege should be limited to those who administer spiritual
counseling. 323 Any communication made outside of that scope, such as
319. A free exercise analysis should not be applied if the state accepts the notion that not
reporting these confidential communications actually furthers the state's interest in protecting
children where the clergy-communicant relationship promotes self-reporting and confidential
counseling to prevent further child abuse. The Court in Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3167, accepted
such a societal benefit argument.
320. See supra notes 110-17 and accompanying text for a discussion of the purposes of child
abuse reporting statutes.
321. Of course, the state can and should provide for permissive reporting from "all per-
sons." See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
322. For example, many states exempt the attorney-client relationship in order to promote
a just solution in civil and criminal disputes. See, eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 908 (1983 &
Supp. 1990); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:32 (1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-11 (1990);
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 34.04 (West 1986 & Supp. 1991); W. VA. CODE § 49-6A-7 (1986);
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14.3-210 (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1991).
323. See, e.g., State v. Motherwell, 788 P.2d 1066 (1990); see also supra notes 29-40 and
accompanying text. One defendant's conviction was reversed because the statute was held to
exempt those "licensed or ordained" within a religious denomination when they were counsel-
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communications made to a friend or communications not intended as
confidential, are not made for the purpose of protecting the child and
therefore should be reported. Any communication made within the
sphere of counseling performed by -lay persons or other figures not di-
rectly related to the religious function of spiritual consolation would not
fall within the clergy-communicant privilege.3 24
Simply taking the abuser out of the specific abusive situation does
not achieve the state's purpose. 25 The state's purpose is only achieved
when there is some indication that abuse will cease in the future. If al-
lowing the privilege is consistent with that effort, it should be respected.
Statutory exemptions for clergy should be viewed as alternatives to the
gauntlet of protracted constitutional litigation tossed before the Free Ex-
ercise Clause by the Supreme Court's abandonment of the compelling
state interest test.
VI. CONCLUSION
Child abuse is one of the most upsetting crimes. Any measures
taken by the state to prevent this crime would certainly garner wide ac-
ceptance and support. Legislative efforts to enlarge the scope of child
abuse reporting statutes to include clergy are intended to further such a
goal. Because some of these statutes mandate reporting in all contexts-
without resort to common law privilege, evidentiary exclusion or statu-
tory exemptions for clergy which are firmly rooted in historical founda-
tions-they invite a conflict between the First Amendment free exercise
exception and the best interests of children.
The United States Supreme Court faced the conflict between a reli-
gious practice and a generally applicable statute in Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources v. Smith,3 26 and rejected the compelling
state interest test. After Smith, child abuse reporting statutes that in-
clude clergy must confront religious exercise in a balancing of inter-
ests.3 27 The resulting jurisprudence limits judicial power to protect and
ing in their role as clergy. Of course, among religious denominations with objective codes and
traditions such as the Roman Catholic Church spiritual counseling will have specific connota-
tions. State statutes should avoid Establishment Clause problems and forcing the courts to
inquire into religious beliefs by careful drafting.
324. Admittedly, such persons may advance an argument that non-reporting would further
the best interests of the child. Such an argument would not be supported by free exercise
considerations.
325. See generally O'Brien, supra note 18 (analyzing the problem of pedophilia among
clergy).
326. 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
327. Id. at 1604.
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advance the best interest of the child by allowing for free exercise excep-
tions to child abuse reporting statutes. Thus, courts applying the reason-
ing of Smith necessarily force minority religious practices and
practitioners through a legal gauntlet that is directly opposed to the First
Amendment's historical foundations and, more importantly, directly op-
posed to the interests of abused children.
Cases such as Maryland v. Craig328 have recently concluded that
when balancing the interests of the child against various constitutional
guarantees, the balance will tip in favor of accommodating the interests
of the child.3 29 The state, however, does not have a monopoly on the
interest in protecting children, nor does the state hold the only means of
achieving that interest. While mandatory reporting requirements insti-
tuted by each state are one means of preventing child abuse, the First
Amendment should not be "accommodated" to satisfy that which the
state cannot prove is exclusively beneficial or effective. A religious ex-
emption from a statutory requirement to report child abuse would at first
appear to be in conflict with the state's goal in that such an exemption
would limit reports of abuse and subsequent investigations. Insight into
the purpose and effect of certain confidential religious communications
shows evidence to the contrary. Because the privilege protecting the
communications would also advance the child's interests by promoting
rehabilitation of the abusive situation, the right to free exercise should
prevail over a broad state objective in such a balancing test.
In light of the great weight given by the courts to the particular state
interest of protecting children, restrictions on the means to advance that
interest should be minimal. If any limits are imposed, they should ad-
vance other weighty interests or further advance the interest in protect-
ing children. Particularized clergy exemptions from mandatory
reporting requirements would do both. As long as those very sacred and
unique circumstances provide another means of eliminating or deterring
future abuse, the state should be open to allowing narrow, carefully con-
sidered restrictions on the all-inclusive requirement to report child abuse.
328. 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990).
329. Id. at 3167; see also Baltimore City Dep't of Social Servs. v. Bouknight, 110 S. Ct. 900
(1990); Osborne v. Ohio, 110 S. Ct. 1691 (1990). See supra notes 270-303 and accompanying
text for a discussion of these cases.
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